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
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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

By Major General *M. Galaktionov*

(Conclusion¹.)

IV. STALINGRAD—ROSTOV

THE RED ARMY'S offensive in the winter of 1942-1943 is a perfect example of how a unified strategic plan is carried out in the course of consecutive operations, each with a clearly defined aim.

We speak of the Stalingrad operation for the encirclement and rout of the German grouping in the region of Stalingrad. But even if we consider the region of Stalingrad alone we find that in reality two different operations were carried out there:

- 1) the operation to encircle the German Stalingrad grouping in November 1942;
- 2) the operation to wipe out the encircled German grouping in January 1943.

The first operation was carried out by the troops of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts; the second by the troops of the Don front.

In the interval between these two operations, however, a number of others, closely connected with them, were carried out. All these operations contributed to the execution of the strategic plan drawn up by the Supreme High Command.

In the initial Stalingrad operation the three fronts were assigned the task of encircling the German grouping. Kalach was singled out as their objective. As is now well known, two of our assault groups, operating from the north-west and south-east, converged in the vicinity of this town, which thereby earned the right to immortality in military annals.

This modest little town on the Don well earned its wreath of laurels. Kalach has every right to compete with its great and famous neighbour—Stalingrad—for glory. It can lay claim to being defined as a strategic objective.

On 19 November artillery fire announced the beginning of an offensive by the Red Army.

The north-western grouping of our troops routed the 3rd Rumanian army and the German formations in the region of the offensive. While rifle formations continued to wipe out enemy units, our tank corps pushed on to the Don. On the morning of 20 November the 26th tank corps took Perelazovsk and, continuing to advance, engaged in battle with the German motorized division covering the river crossings in the vicinity of Kalach. On 22 November this corps finally took one of the crossings and entrenched itself on the left bank of the Don. On 23 November the corps overcame the enemy's resistance and at two o'clock in the afternoon it took the town of Kalach.

The south-eastern grouping of Soviet troops routed the 6th Rumanian corps. The 4th mechanized Red Army corps entered the breach on 20 November and on 22 November it already emerged in the vicinity of Sovetskoye where it entrenched itself strongly and beat back enemy counter-attacks. On 23 November the corps established contact with the 26th tank corps in the vicinity of Kalach. The ring of encirclement was closed.

This was a decisive moment. We may say that closing the ring of encirclement in the vicinity of Kalach marked the attainment of the strategic objective. Indeed, all the attempts the enemy subsequently made to change the situation were futile. However, in territorially designating a strategic objective, we must not forget either the defensive period that preceded nor the subsequent offensive operations. Only then can we appreciate the full depth and brilliance of Stalin's strategic scheme.

In the campaign of 1942 the initiative was at first in the hands of the German Command. One should not forget this when considering the strategic plan of the Red Army Supreme High Command.

The socialist structure of our country is best suited to ensure the planned direction of

¹ Continued from VOKS Bulletin Nos. 5, 6, 7, 1945.

war. Thanks to the inspired foresight of Marshal Stalin, the Soviet Union was fully prepared to withstand the grim trials of war. The Stalin Five-Year Plans represented the highest type of socialist planning. Nevertheless, it is necessary to bear in mind the fundamental difference between our peace-loving country and aggressive Germany.

At the beginning of the war Germany obtained a temporary advantage precisely because she had prepared for war, because she was the attacking side.

In his speech of 6 November, 1941, Stalin said:

"Lenin distinguished between two kinds of war—predatory, and therefore unjust wars, and wars of liberation, just wars.

"The Germans are now waging a predatory war, an unjust war, for the purpose of seizing foreign territory and subjugating foreign peoples. That is why all honest people must rise against the German invaders, as enemies.

"Unlike Hitler Germany, the Soviet Union and its Allies are waging a war of liberation, a just war, for the purpose of liberating the enslaved peoples of Europe and the U. S. S. R. from Hitler's tyranny."

Stalin said "we have not, and cannot have, any such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples." Aggressive Germany, on the other hand, pursued predatory aims in the war. Speaking from the military point of views, this meant that she was more prepared for war. This meant that at the beginning the initiative in conducting military operations was in her hands.

It goes without saying that it is always easier for the attacking side to plan operations.

However, as Stalin pointed out in his Order of the Day of the 23 February 1942, Germany's advantages were only temporary. As the war progressed, permanently operating factors came to the fore.

The Stalinist planning of war is scientific planning. It is based on the correct estimation of the correlation of forces, on the calculation of all the factors of war, on the lucid comprehension of the distinctive features of every phase of war.

During the period in question the planning of the war had to be carried on under exceptionally difficult conditions. The enemy was pressing deep into the interior of the Soviet

Union. Of course, our socialist country had tremendous advantages in respect to organizing the supplying of the front. It must be remembered, however, that the enemy's invasion adversely affected all our economy. The fact that our country was able to cope with such colossal difficulties testifies to the mighty power of the socialist system.

Stalin firmly led the Soviet people through all the difficulties and trials of war. He ensured the planned direction of the war in every respect. The industry set up in the east began to supply the front with armaments and war materiel in ever increasing quantities and of ever better quality.

On the eve of the summer campaign, on 1 May, 1942, Stalin pointed out to the troops and the people the noble and exalted aim they were pursuing in this war.

"We are waging a just war for our country and our freedom. It is not our aim to seize foreign lands or to subjugate foreign peoples. Our aim is clear and noble. We want to free our Soviet land of the German-fascist scoundrels."

This lofty aim inspired the heroes of Stalingrad to the performance of exploits worthy of the knights of old. This aim determined the strategy of the Soviet Union and directed the operations of the Soviet troops throughout the war.

In the subsequent phases of the war the Stalinist strategy set the troops concrete goals in accordance with the new situation. The Stalinist strategy determined the direction of the main blow. In the strategic plans of the Supreme High Command the strategic goal, the decisive objective of all the operations, is clearly and lucidly designated.

What was the strategic objective set by the Soviet Command in the campaign of 1942?

To answer this question let us first get a clear picture of the distinctive features of this campaign.

In it the initiative was at first in the hands of the German Command. The latter pursued the decisive goals of bringing about the complete defeat of the Red Army and the conquest of the Soviet Union. In the course of its offensive operations the German armies broke through far to the south along a gigantic salient running from Voronezh through Stalingrad to the North Caucasus and on to Novorossiisk.

The Soviet Command deliberately caused Stalingrad to become a centre of gravity in the

war. Nevertheless the Germans still held the initiative and they continued their furious drive against the Stalingrad defences. Only when the initiative had been seized from the enemy, only when the Soviet troops had gone over to the offensive could a strategic or decisive goal be set the troops. This objective was, however, already foreseen by the Soviet Command in the period of defence, long before the Red Army took over the offensive and while the initiative was still wholly in the hands of the enemy. This is one of the most remarkable manifestations of the genius of the Stalinist strategy.

The idea that defence must be concluded by a transition to the offensive is one of the oldest rules of military science. In modern warfare it has become incomparably more difficult to seize the initiative from the enemy in view of the tremendous scale on which operations are waged, operations involving armies of millions fighting over a tremendous front. But it was the remarkable planning of the operations of the Red Army, a planning that united the defensive and offensive periods, that distinguished the campaign of 1942, that made of it one of the greatest triumphs of the military art.

We have already pointed out, and wish here to stress, that so unified and integral a planning of the defence and offense was practically excluded by their very essence. Any reader who has attentively followed the course of the campaign of 1942 will agree with this statement. Indeed, how could the Stalingrad operation of encirclement have been planned at the beginning of the German offensive? Such a supposition would be absurd. But perhaps the defence should, from the very beginning, have striven to create a centre of gravity at Stalingrad? We already know that the Soviet Command originally directed all its efforts towards barring the Germans from the shortest routes to Moscow, as a result of which Voronezh came to be the centre of gravity.

It is impossible to plan a defensive campaign without discovering the enemy's plans. This is a simple enough truth, but it must be clearly understood by all who wish to understand the course of the campaigns in this war. The military commander has no more difficult task than that of being able to discover the enemy's plans in good time. What, however, about the information obtained by the recon-

naissance service? Does not the High Command of an army today possess a tremendous amount of information about the enemy? The trouble here is that the very abundance of this information leads to confusion.

It is primarily in the manner in which the German plans were discovered that the brilliance of the Stalinist planning of the 1942 operations lies. The Stalinist planning was scientific. This means that it correctly estimated the general disposition of forces in the war and at the same time correctly estimated the distinctive features of the situation during each phase of the war. Despite the extremely variable and unstable situation, Stalin discovered the enemy's main objective and the direction of his blows. In organizing the new defensive front the Supreme High Command took the important decision of defending Stalingrad with all its forces and at all costs. As a result of this decision the centre of gravity of the battle being fought all along the front shifted to Stalingrad.

In the first phase of the Stalingrad engagement the Red Army, as we know, defended itself, while the Hitlerites attacked. The troops defending Stalingrad were set the aim of defending the city. This aim, at first glance in any case, was a tactical one. It must not be forgotten that at the same time the Supreme High Command also set objectives to the other fronts—immediate, tactical objectives. Before we turn to the problem that interests us—that of the strategic objective—we must consider the various aspects of the question in turn.

It is quite obvious that in the period of strategic defence the Soviet Command was faced primarily with the task of stopping the Germans, preventing them from attaining their objectives. We have already had occasion to speak of how extremely difficult this task is in modern warfare in which offensives are carried on over a wide front and in which the attacking side has every opportunity of rapidly following up initial tactical gains. To stop the advance of mobile enemy groups after a front has been breached is approximately tantamount to building a dam when a river runs wild.

The defending side must, of course, halt the enemy advance on all sectors. The valourous resistance of the troops on various sectors is of tremendous significance because they thereby gain precious time in which to bring up reserves and erect fortified lines of defence in

the rear. Tactical measures alone, however, are insufficient. After all, the enemy concentrates his forces on definite directions and local means of defence ordinarily prove insufficient. Thus, the defending side must also concentrate its efforts on definite directions, acting in accordance with its strategic plan.

We see, therefore, that even if the defending side restricts itself to the task of halting the enemy forces that are advancing with decisive goals in view, it is compelled to concentrate its forces and undertake active operations on definite directions. To fail to do this means to subject itself to great risk. Could we have checked the Germans in 1942 without concentrating our efforts on the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Mozdok directions? Of course not.

Let us now assume that the defending side has succeeded in elucidating the direction of the enemy's main blow and in concentrating its reserves here in order to repulse the enemy onslaught. In that case one may conclude that the strategic objective of the defending side consists in halting the enemy on this, principal, direction. It would be more correct, however, to speak of the creation of a centre of gravity of the struggle being waged on the whole front.

The campaign of 1942 is a superb example in illustration of this question. The Germans were driving towards Moscow and were stopped at Voronezh. The strategic objective of the Germans was Moscow, while Voronezh might be designated as the strategic objective of the defending side. This formulation is not quite precise, however, and it would be more correct to say that at the beginning of the campaign Voronezh came to be the centre of gravity of the fighting. Why? Because at that particular moment the defending side could not yet achieve any decisive result, the initiative still remained in the hands of the Germans who preserved a marked numerical superiority of forces in the south. We saw that even after being defeated at Voronezh the Germans did not give up their main objective—Moscow—and merely proceeded to direct their blow at Stalingrad. It should be added that, naturally, another reason why the defending side could not speak of having achieved any decisive success was that although he was checked at Voronezh, further south the enemy continued to seize our cities and threatened the Caucasus.

Thus, although the defending side must concentrate its efforts, although it can and must set itself a strategic objective, it is more difficult for it to correctly select the centre at which to concentrate its main forces, for the initiative remains in the hands of the enemy. The decision of the Supreme High Command to shift the centre of gravity of the struggle to Stalingrad is an example of a military commander's inspired insight. While the German adventurers befuddled the situation by setting fantastic goals, Marshal Stalin comprehended the decisive significance that the battles for Stalingrad had for the outcome of the whole campaign at the very beginning of the struggle for Stalingrad.

Even, however, in respect to the initial period of the Stalingrad engagement, the centre of gravity here deserves attention. The situation was still vague and variable. The initiative still being in the enemy's hands, the latter could again change the direction of his blow. In August 1942 the Soviet troops were set the task of defending Stalingrad. At that time it was still too early to set the troops a strategic objective, if only for the reason that the Germans might still reconsider their own intention of capturing Stalingrad.

The brilliance of Stalin's strategy manifested itself in the fact that even in this early phase, when the Germans were still winning tactical gains in the south, Stalin already had his strategic objective in mind and expressed it in a document addressed to the Command of the armies at Stalingrad.

How was this possible? After all, the Germans might simply have turned away from Stalingrad and then the campaign would have taken a different course. This became possible not only because Stalin foresaw the future development of events but subordinated them to his will. To an even greater extent than in peace, planning in war time means to act as well as to calculate. Consequently, when, in August 1942, Stalin already had a strategic objective in mind which by its very nature could be set the troops only at a later date, he directed all the operations of the troops and all the measures of the Soviet Command over a huge front towards the achievements of a single purpose. This meant exerting constant pressure on the enemy in order to alter the whole situation to one's own advantage.

Here we come to one extremely important feature of the Stalingrad operation of en-

circlement. Consideration of this feature will help us gain a better understanding of how brilliant the scheme of this operation was. It is frequently said that an encircling operation is the most difficult of all operations. The operation is complex, and it requires, especially in our day, very thorough preparation on the part of attacking troops. The enemy need make but a comparatively slight and simple redisposition of his forces to bring all the plans of the attacking side to nought. In 1805 the Austrian general, Mack, failed to retreat in good time and allowed Napoleon to encircle him. Kutuzov, on the other hand, perceived his powerful adversary's schemes, made remarkably rapid and skilful marches and did not allow himself to be encircled.

Encircling operations therefore involve the peculiar problem of so trapping the enemy in the preparatory period of the operation as to prevent him from slipping away. This is a most difficult thing to do, for it entails not only holding the enemy tactically bound, but misleading the Command of a large enemy grouping, its High Command. It is a stratagem in a strategic plan.

In 1942 the enemy found himself pinned down to Stalingrad, and pinned down in such wise that despite all his desire to do so he could not move. That this did not happen by chance can be proved beyond a doubt. The document cited above and dated the beginning of August testifies to this, but there is also other, and totally objective proof. This is the distribution and introduction of strategic reserves, which is, in general, a reliable index of the plans of a high command in modern warfare. Had Soviet troops merely been set the task of defending Stalingrad it might have been expected that the Soviet Command would throw in all its reserves for the direct defence of the city. Yet, in 1942, the Soviet Command sent only a limited quantity of reserves to the sectors of the Stalingrad defence. At first glance this seems to contradict the set objective of defending Stalingrad. In reality, however, there is here contained a totally different interpretation of this objective as one not only tactical in character but of much deeper strategic significance. Beyond the defensive objective, there lay concealed an offensive objective.

As we have already shown, the task of defending Stalingrad was important in itself. Stalingrad was a connecting link between our South and our Centre and its retention ensured

the continuity of the front at the most critical point. This alone clearly indicates that the task of defending the city was not merely a narrow tactical task. Stalingrad was not merely a city but a centre of communications, and these communications had to be liberated at all costs. On the other hand, the task of defending Stalingrad could not be solved tactically, even if it were a matter of merely defending the city itself. To introduce large reserves on the sectors on the right bank, every inch of which was under fire, was both inexpedient (it was often more convenient to operate with small groups, the troops then suffering smaller losses) and useless (since the place d'armes on the right bank of the Volga kept growing narrower, and the Germans kept acquiring ever greater tactical advantages). In this case one may ask why the Soviet Command so stubbornly insisted on defending the ruins of a city that no longer had any tactical significance? Only now has it become clear to us that the Stalingrad defence pinned down a huge German grouping.

The facts show irrefutably that a strategic plan aiming towards the encirclement and rout of the enemy grouping was already in operation in this early phase of the Stalingrad engagement. Suvorov won fame by his ability to take the enemy's psychology into account. The large scale of modern military operations makes this incomparably more difficult. However, beyond all doubt, this was accomplished in the planning of the Stalingrad engagement. In setting the Soviet troops the task of defending Stalingrad our Commander-in-Chief was certain that the Russian soldier would hold out to the last breath. His confidence is easy to understand, for it was a matter of saving our country. In this case, however, it was also necessary to correctly estimate the enemy's psychology: meeting with resistance, the Germans would persist in striving to take the city, and Hitler, to save his prestige, would be unable to back out and give up this goal.

Concentrating our shock troops on the flanks of the German Stalingrad grouping was a brilliant organizational achievement. One naturally asks, however, how the Germans could have allowed so risky a situation for themselves to have arisen. Could they really have failed to foresee the possibility of flank attacks and have known nothing about the large Soviet forces being concentrated for such

attacks. The German Command, of course, took the risky nature of its position into account, and it probably had information about the concentration of Soviet reserves. The explanation needs must be sought in the nature of German psychology.

The Germans gradually and quite to their own surprise, became involved in the battle for Stalingrad. Once involved in it, they could not go back on their own intentions and every day found themselves more deeply involved. They saw the danger of their position, but attached little importance to it. They counted on repulsing flank attacks, and, in the event of a breach, on quickly eliminating the danger by means of counter-attacks made by their own reserves. It should be said that considering the strength of the fortifications they had erected, the amount of their equipment and the size of their forces, their reasoning was not without foundation. But again the Germans overestimated their own strength and underestimated that of their enemy.

We have been trying the reader's patience for some time now, and if he says at this point that he already understands quite clearly that the strategic objective of the Soviet Command in the campaign of 1942 was *Stalingrad*, we cannot but agree. However, we must subject the reader's patience to one more trial.

Stalingrad was obviously singled out to serve as a strategic objective. Linked with this designation were three very important factors in the strategic plan of the Soviet Command.

First, to halt the Germans, defend *Stalingrad*, and build up a continuous defence front from Voronezh through *Stalingrad* to the North Caucasus. This was a defensive aim, the accomplishment of which required retaining *Stalingrad* as the central link at all costs.

Second, to set up the centre of gravity at *Stalingrad*; to involve the main German grouping in a stubborn, protracted battle; to weaken them morally and physically by heavy losses, and to pin down the German *Stalingrad* grouping with the purpose of preparing active operations against it.

Third, to hurl large strategic reserves into the fighting in the district of *Stalingrad* at a definite moment, creating assault groups on the flanks of the German grouping to encircle and destroy it.

The set objective was linked with a transition to the offensive so as to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy. In actual point of fact, when the Soviet troops launched an attack on 19 November 1942, the most difficult stage was already over as far as strategy was concerned; the plan was drawn up and put into operation. The most remarkable feature of this plan was the unity of the strategic leadership of both the defensive and the offensive phases of the campaign of 1942. The strategic objective should serve to unite and concentrate the efforts of the troops of the whole front for achieving a decisive result. In the given case this was accomplished for both the period of defence and the period of the offensive. The defence of *Stalingrad*, *Stalingrad* as the centre of gravity of the whole struggle, the encirclement and rout of the German *Stalingrad* grouping—all go to form three links, united into a single whole, which should be designated "*Stalingrad*".

Is such a designation necessary? Will it bring any benefit to military science, will it serve as a guiding element for military commanders in the future? *Stalingrad* was, after all, an exceptional phenomenon, one absolutely inimitable. Nevertheless this designation is necessary, for it denotes the triumph of military science, the triumph of reason in a situation marked by a stormy and contradictory development of events.

One must not allow oneself to lose sight of this situation if one wishes to understand the events that took place. In August 1942 the Soviet south was wrapped in the flames of war. The enemy struck on various directions, while our defence was still very unstable. The country was threatened by the gravest danger. At this time the Commander-in-Chief conceived a plan which subjected the extremely complex pattern of the struggle to the direction of reason.

"Give me a place to stand and I will move the world," said Archimedes. To direct the events of the summer of 1942 the Commander-in-Chief had need of a fulcrum. *Stalingrad* served this purpose. At the leader's word it was created by the heroes of the *Stalingrad* defence. The centre of gravity of the struggle was shifted here. A firm foundation was created for elaborating and carrying out Stalin's brilliant plan.

Future military commanders will act under different circumstances. Past si-

tuations are never exactly repeated in war. However, a study of the Stalingrad engagement will serve as a valuable lesson in how to set a lucid goal upon which to concentrate the efforts of the armies and the country for the winning of victory.

In the beginning of October representatives of the Staff of the Supreme High Command, Army General Zhukov and Colonel-General Vasilevsky held several conferences with Lieutenant-General Rokossovsky, Commander of the Don Front, Colonel-General Vatutin, Commander of the South-Western Front, Colonel-General Eremenko, Commander of the Stalingrad Front (the division into fronts is shown in the appended diagram). At these conferences they discussed plans for offensive operations aiming to carry out the strategic plan of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Thus a precise date may be given for the beginning of the third¹ period of the strategic defence, the period in which the Commander indicated the strategic objective to the troops. But this was preceded by the second period, in which the commander already had these objectives in mind but had not yet informed the troops of them, i. e., August-September 1942. It was then that the strategic situation making possible the transition to the offensive was created.

In the midst of the bitter fighting in the South, where the initiative was still in the hands of the enemy, Stalin looked to the future in disposing his forces all along the front. The disposition of reserves is one of the most important duties of the High Command in modern warfare. What reserves should be moved where in order to stop the Germans? What reserves should be kept at one's disposal for future offensive operations, and where should they be sent? On this, all else depends. The strategic reserves are the lever by means of which the commander alters the situation to his advantage.

When the guns barked out on 19 November the astonished world learned that the Red Army, which, according to Hitler's communiqués, was utterly crushed, still had at its disposal huge, fresh, well-armed formations which were now being introduced. This was a triumph of Stalinist strategy.

¹ The author speaks about the three periods in strategic defence in the 2nd chapter under the heading *Stalingrad—the Centre of Gravity of the Struggle*. See VOKS Bulletin, No. 7, 1945.

Among the principles of strategy observed by the French, there is one that is called the principle of the economy of forces. It was brilliantly observed by the Soviet Command, which set the task in 1942 of checking the German offensive with the fewest possible forces.

Despite the exceedingly difficult situation, the Supreme High Command of the Red Army was able to preserve the main body of its strategic reserves. The Stalinist strategy also observed another guiding strategic principle; that of concentrating forces and means in the decisive spot at the decisive moment.

In accordance with the set strategic aim the main body of reserves was now flung into battle to inflict a decisive blow in the vicinity of Stalingrad. At the same time part of the reserves were concentrated on other sectors to inflict blows which were to follow at a later date.


The concentration of reserves in the indicated districts (in accordance with the scheme of the Commander-in-Chief) was excellently carried out by the Command of the fronts and homefront organizations. This guaranteed an element of surprise to the inflicted blows.

The correct designation of the strategic goal—Stalingrad—ensured the success of the defensive phase of the campaign, created favourable conditions for the transition to the offensive and directed the efforts of the troops towards the attainment of a decisive result in the offensive phase of the campaign.

Near Stalingrad was stationed a powerful German grouping—300,000 strong, excellently armed, holding a strongly fortified position, its flanks defended by a force whose strength was normal for such a situation.

The Soviet Command likewise concentrated large forces near Stalingrad, equipped with war machines the might of which proved most unexpected to the Germans. Nevertheless, taking into account all the forces stationed in the vicinity of Stalingrad and in the rear (an estimation which will be finally completed only later, when all the documents will have been fully studied), it was still the Germans, rather than the Soviet troops, that had the numerical superiority.

It should not be forgotten that in carrying out encircling operations the attacking troops inevitably place themselves in a dangerous position. In this particular case it was a matter of encircling a German grouping numeri-



Military Operations at the Approaches to Stalingrad

cially greater than any ever before known to history.

What if the Germans had directed a powerful blow from the district of Stalingrad towards the West at a time when the ring of encirclement was not yet secure? But the Germans reacted only by launching isolated counterattacks. Their numerous grouping was literally frozen near Stalingrad.

This, of course, was the result of the paralyzing effect of the suddenness of our action. The Germans unexpectedly found themselves in the position of a defending side. At this point the analysis we so insistently made in regard to defence will prove of use to the reader in explaining the behaviour of the Germans.

Defence is doomed to failure when the commander does not discover the objectives of the attacking side and does not set a clear objective before his own troops. The Germans actually failed to understand the strategic objectives pursued by the Soviet Command. By 23 November, of course, it was already clear enough to them that they were being

surrounded. However, the German Command did not attach any particular significance to this fact. It relied on its own experience in carrying out encircling operations, which had not led to any decisive results on the Soviet-German front.

This time, however, the Germans miscalculated: in this case the German army was caught in a noose and death was inevitable. Beyond Kalach the Germans did not see Stalingrad, although they were actually amidst the ruins of this great city. It would be more correct to say that Stalingrad hypnotized them. The fascist wolf, caught in a trap, sensed its own doom but could not turn away.

The Stalinist plan was carried out by brave and talented brilliant people. Never yet had the union of strategy and tactics been so complete. The encircling operation was successful because of the skilful action of the troops of all arms, without whom there could have been no success.

With scathing fire the powerful Soviet artillery blazed a path for the troops into the interior of the enemy defences. The artillery

escorted and supported the troops throughout the entire operation.

An important role was played by the rapid manoeuvring of Red Army mobile formations. They closed the encircling ring around the German Stalingrad grouping and surrounded enemy groups within the zone of the offensive.

Soviet air forces reined supreme over the field of battle.

Powerful Soviet infantry forces valiantly stormed enemy fortifications, making breaches for the entry of the tanks. Behind the tanks came masses of infantry lending the encirclement the strength of an impregnable wall cutting the Germans off from the west.

The tactics of manoeuvring, based on the flexible and planned interaction of all arms, ensured the rapid and successful accomplishment of the tasks set by the Command.

As great as is the significance of these factors, all favourable to the Red Army, they cannot fully explain the success of the encircling operation. When considered from a narrowly tactical point of view the operation seemed impossible, and it was this that misled the German Command. The troops had to operate in the immediate rear of a powerful German grouping and a flanking march of this kind seemed extremely risky. To decide to carry out the encircling operation under such circumstances was an act of the greatest boldness on the part of the commander. But this decision was based on a sober calculation of all the factors favouring victory and proved practicable and correct.

The main point was that the tactical operations of the Soviet troops were correctly directed and aimed at a single decisive goal, while the efforts of the German troops were scattered and disunified, lacking the force conveyed by a unified scheme.

The German lack of unity may be attributed to the effect of the suddenness of our action, but it should be thoroughly understood. The tactical suddenness attained in this operation was very important, but the strategic suddenness was still more important. The German Command failed to understand the essence and depth of the brilliant strategic scheme of the Red Army's Supreme High Command. It reacted blindly and helplessly and showed no initiative.

Strategy introduces plan, unity and singleness of purpose into the tactical operations

of the troops and this is a very real advantage that multiplies fighting power. In the Stalingrad encircling operation our Commander-in-Chief set the troops a very bold and difficult task, but he also created favourable conditions for its accomplishment, directing the blows of our army against the weakest sectors of the German defence. On these sectors the enemy forces were crushed by rapid and planned blows at the very moment when their situation became clear to them.

The fact that the German grouping was pinned down in the region of Stalingrad was of the greatest importance. This fact was far from accidental. It was the valiant defence of this city that pinned the Germans down to Stalingrad. We saw how the Germans gradually became more and more involved in the battle for Stalingrad and when the German Command began to comprehend how dangerous was their position it was already too late. The Soviet Command took advantage of the fact that the German grouping was thus pinned down and launched an offensive.

Several Soviet armies from the South-Western and Don Fronts entered the breach and, turning eastward towards Stalingrad, pressed the ring of encirclement tighter. Steadily surrounding and wiping out the enemy formations, they reached the Kotluban-Sovetskoe front by the end of November. The southern sector of the area of encirclement ran from the latter point to a point on the Volga south of Stalingrad and was held by the troops of the Stalingrad front.

The German grouping was encircled. Perhaps now the Hitler Command would decide to utilize all the tremendous forces and equipment of its Stalingrad grouping to break through to the west? This decision was never made. It is our conviction that it was already impossible at the time and that, in any case, it was certainly not acceptable to the Hitler clique.

Firstly, at this time more than ever before, such a decision would denote open admission of Germany's defeat in her eastern campaign.

Secondly, there was little chance of breaking through the ring of encirclement, which was growing stronger with every hour and was constantly being reinforced by new Red Army units.

Thirdly, the German formations that might have broken through would have had to retreat across the Don steppes for a distance of

about 400 kilometres under the cross-fire of Soviet formations west of Stalingrad.

Stalingrad proved to be a trap for the fascist wolf. Now this trap snapped shut.

From August through November the Supreme High Command of the Red Army consistently pursued the aim of inflicting a decisive defeat upon the Germans in the region of Stalingrad. It concentrated all the efforts of the Red Army and the Soviet Union to this end. The creation of a centre of gravity in Stalingrad, the organization of its protracted and stubborn defence, the preparation of active operations and the disposition of forces, the launching of an offensive on 19 November, the encirclement of the German grouping—all this was directed towards the attainment of the strategic objective for which there is only one correct designation: Stalingrad.

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When, however, one reviews the course of the campaign of the summer of 1942 and the winter of 1942—1943 as a whole, one can find grounds for designating *Rostov* as the strategic objective. After all, the campaign was concluded with the capture of Rostov. There is no contradiction here between this and what has just been said about Stalingrad. On the contrary, it gives us a deeper understanding of the brilliance of Stalin's scheme.

The territorial designation of a strategic objective is conditional. Thus, the designation "Stalingrad" was analyzed above to include three phases of the Battle for Stalingrad. On the other hand, the territorial designation is necessary and should be given lucidly and clearly. The strategic objective should indicate not only "what" and "how", but also "where" and "to where".

The strategic objective indicates the direction of the main blow, the centre of gravity against which the efforts of all the troops and even the whole country are to be exerted. It is this that is expressed in the designation "Stalingrad." Until the very end of the campaign the principal events took place in the region of Stalingrad.

However, the operation to encircle the German Stalingrad grouping was not the only one. Other operations were also carried on during the offensive phase of the campaign. In the course of these operations the troops of several fronts advanced upon Rostov and

finally captured it. Consequently, it is possible to speak of directing the main blow of these fronts against Rostov.

Rostov was undoubtedly the objective of a number of offensive operations carried on by our troops in the campaign of 1942—1943. The question is, are we dealing here with a tactical or a strategic objective? We remember that for the Germans Rostov was only a tactical objective, for they set themselves different strategic objectives. What were the circumstances in the offensive of the Red Army?

We may say from the very outset that in relation to Stalingrad the capture of Rostov by the Red Army played merely an auxiliary role. It was the encirclement and rout of the German Stalingrad grouping that was of decisive significance. The point is, however, that this decisive result was attained not only by means of the Stalingrad operation itself, but also by means of offensive operations carried out on the Rostov direction. To make this peculiarity clear, Rostov must also be designated as a strategic objective. Actually, however, we are dealing with a single strategic objective which may be conditionally designated as "Stalingrad—Rostov."

The strategic plan of the Soviet Command was based on a concrete estimation of the situation. Its distinctive feature was the formation by the autumn of 1942 of a gigantic salient that ran from Voronezh, through Stalingrad, to the North Caucasus. This salient came into being in consequence of the German offensive and the measures taken by the Soviet defence. In November 1942 the situation began, to a certain extent, to grow stable. It became constantly more apparent that the Germans who had pushed hundreds of kilometres to the east and had reached the Volga and the Terek, were unable to attain the strategic objectives they had set themselves.

Nevertheless, the situation became threatening for the Soviet Union. First of all, the Germans did not give up their attempts to develop their offensive, to break the resistance of the Soviet troops on a number of sectors where our defence was still rather wavering. They made furious attacks against Stalingrad, thinking to break the newly formed Soviet front at this point and to continue to advance towards their set objectives on the North and the South.

Independently of this, however, the enemy seized vast tracts of territory that were of

economic importance to the U. S. S. R. Important lines of communication that connected the Centre with the South were severed. The oil of Baku, over which there already lay the shadow of the German vulture's wing, had to be transported by a circuitous route. Had the Germans succeeded in wintering at the positions that had attained, the following summer campaign would have confronted the Soviet Union with the greatest hardships and the most dangerous threats. It was a matter of life and death for the U. S. S. R. to regain the territory seized by the enemy in the summer of 1942.

True, by checking the Germans the Red Army had inflicted a telling strategic effect upon them. The situation which thereby arose bore at least an external resemblance to those which resulted from strategically incomPLETED German offensive in the last war. When the attacking side fails to attain its decisive objectives it inevitably falls into a dangerous situation. This is quite comprehensible, for the objective is considered decisive precisely because its attainment completes an offensive, is crowned by victory and the defeat of the enemy. If the objective is not attained, then the attacking side is compelled, if the enemy is active, to go over to the defence under unfavourable conditions.

The campaign of 1942 confirms this. The Germans were checked on their way to strategic objectives which they could not attain. If they should refuse to attempt further advance, they would have to set up an improvised defence at chance positions. The Red Army flanked the German troops that had broken through to the east. The German lines of communication were extremely long and threatened by flanking attacks.

It may thus be said that the Germans landed in a "sack" resembling those that were formed in the German offensives of 1918 on the Western Front. However, the question should not be over-simplified.

The differences between this war and the last should always be borne in mind. First of all, it should be remembered that the scales of these two wars were altogether different. Can one speak of "sacks" in the sense of the campaigns of 1918, when operations extended over hundreds of kilometres? Can one speak of flanking attacks of strategic significance in connection with such dimensions? Only in a totally different sense than the "sacks" of 1918.


A second difference is the strengthening of defence in this war as compared with 1918. In view of the present colossal impregnation of fire power, much stronger lines of defence can now be erected much more rapidly. The hardest part of modern defence is to repulse masses of tanks when they break through into the interior. The Germans, however, considered in this case that the initiative was still in their hands and that at the very worst there would follow a period of temporary stabilization during which they would be able to build up firm defence lines. In all justice it must be admitted that the Germans lost no time and managed to erect very strong defensive fortifications, and this not only at Stalingrad, where these fortifications were particularly strong.

The calculations of the German Command did, therefore, have some foundation, but they were based on the assumption that their enemy would apply ordinary strategy. It never occurred to the German Command that altogether different methods might be utilized in order to take advantage of the peculiarities of the existing situation.

The Achilles' heel in the German position, somewhat elongated to the east, was, in accordance with tradition, the embryo of a "sack." A glance at the diagram will show that this embryonic sack was situated along the line Boguchari—Millerovo—Rostov. The German troops east of this line could be cut off from the western bases.

To solve the problem by ordinary strategy it would have been necessary to inflict a decisive defeat on the German troops that had broken through to the east and to liberate the territory they had seized. To do this a powerful grouping would have had to be created north of Boguchari. By striking out to the south this grouping would have reached Rostov and thereby have cut the Germans off from the rear. In that case Rostov would have become the strategic objective. What we have explained about the strategic significance of Rostov (the gate to the Don and the North Caucasus) spoke in favour of such a solution.

It is most interesting to note that, as we all know, a blow to the south was actually struck from the vicinity of Boguchari in the course of the campaign of 1942—1943. However, as we shall see, it had an altogether different aim. Rostov was taken as a result of combined blows from the north, east and south.



The Annihilation of German Troops Surrounded at Stalingrad

Let us consider the distance from Boguchar to Rostov: a matter of 300 kilometres. If a blow had been dealt along this direction at that time, the Germans could have retarded our offensive while retaining full freedom of manoeuvre in the expanse of territory to the east. In particular, the Stalingrad grouping could have escaped, leaving some outposts in the region of the city. Under such circumstances we would not have enjoyed any particular advantages in the ensuing engagement.

An opposite solution might also have been adopted—again in the spirit of ordinary strategy: that of striking blows along the whole length of the salient. The strategic objective would have been Rostov. The Marne sack was wiped out in 1918 in this manner. But, in the first place, the Germans would then have had time to retreat, even though suffering losses, to the river Vel. In the second place, this sack was of altogether different dimensions than that of the Marne. A decision of this kind would have entailed the scattering of our forces and would only have made it easier for the Germans, by

means of manoeuvring their reserves within the lines, to repulse our blows.

The Stalinist decision was absolutely original and yet strictly scientific. It took full advantage of the peculiar features of the situation and of the advantages of our flanking position. It ensured the element of surprise, left no way out for the enemy and led to the complete defeat of the German army, a defeat from which it could never recover.

Did this Stalinist strategy set the task of liberating the Don and the North Caucasus from the German usurpers? Of course it did. Of course, the Germans could not be allowed to remain on this territory. Of course Rostov, the strategic key to this territory, had to be taken. Moreover, this task was so important, that the mere liberation of this territory, even if the Germans succeeded in retreating more or less safely, was, in itself, of decisive, strategic significance. The point was, however, that in the above strategic versions Rostov, the strategic objective, would never have been attained. The only correct decision was that which was taken and carried out in the campaign of 1942—1943. While, from the

point of view of ordinary strategy, the taking of Rostov was a prerequisite, in the Stalin scheme it became the concluding link.

The Stalinist leadership of these operations embodies the spirit of classical military art as manifested in the best examples. The main thing is to crush the enemy's armed forces. It was impossible to liberate such a vast territory from the Germans without crushing the tremendous enemy forces located on it. This was the main point in the strategic plan, and in achieving the main point the task of liberating this territory was also accomplished.

Did this Stalinist strategy utilize the advantages of our flanking position in regard to the German troops located east of the Boguchari—Rostov line? Of course it did. All operations were based on the utilization of these advantages. But this was done with strict regard for scales and distances.

Shock groups of Soviet troops were concentrated on the flanks of the German grouping in the region of Stalingrad. They were directed against the rear of this group, with the task of cutting it off and surrounding it. The question arose as to whether operations on so narrow a sector, which constituted only an insignificant part of all the territory captured by the Germans in the summer of 1942, could be of strategic, decisive significance? Since the success of a strategic offensive is determined by its suddenness, there was a danger that the Germans, warned by the attacks in the region of Stalingrad, might counter-manoeuvre and our offensive would die out?

The Stalinist solution was the wisest and only correct one. Even in this offensive phase, it set up the centre of gravity in the region of Stalingrad. The German main grouping was located here and its encirclement and rout was of decisive significance. The Stalinist solution took full account of the moral significance that victory in the colossal battle for Stalingrad would have: this crowned the defence, the heroism of which had already shaken the Hitler empire to its foundation. The strategic objective was Stalingrad.

The effect of the suddenness of our offensive proved sufficient to effect the encirclement of the German Stalingrad grouping. This alone, however, did not exhaust the strategic suddenness of the Soviet offensive: the Stalinist strategy prepared surprises it had

never dreamt of for the German Command. A brilliant succession of new operations and blows was carried out that eliminated the German Command's freedom of manoeuvring its reserves. All these operations were closely interconnected and developed in accordance with a unified strategic plan drawn up before the offensive was actually begun. These operations not only led to the extermination of the German Stalingrad grouping but also to the capture of Rostov. That is why, while retaining the decisive role for Stalingrad, it is correct to designate Stalingrad—Rostov as the strategic objective of the whole campaign of 1942—1943.

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It has already been said that the Stalinist direction of the operations of 1942 observed the principles of classical strategy. This includes the principle of guarantee. This principle involves more than merely guaranteeing the necessary forces and means, supplies, armaments and ammunition. It includes guaranteeing the success of operations despite possible counter-manoeuvres on the part of the foe.

Stalin teaches the Red Army the art of sureness in beating the enemy. The Stalinist solution of the problem of guaranteeing operations is absolutely new and original. Today this task is made extremely complicated by the existence of a solid line of fortified fronts hundreds of kilometres long with echeloned reserves in the interior. An offensive operation begun on some one sector of the front evokes immediate reaction on the part of the enemy who straightway throws nearlying reserves into battle. In the Stalingrad operation our advancing troops closed the ring of encirclement in the region of Kalach, but the Germans could have broken it by attacks from within or without. The German Command rejected breaking it from within for this involved abandoning city districts that they had taken at the cost of so much blood. It would have meant the loss of the Stalingrad battle. The German Command consequently decided to break the ring of encirclement by means of blows from without and to do this it created two new groupings in the regions of Tormosino and Kotelnikovo.

The Stalingrad fighting thus spread into the interior of the salient formed as a result of the German summer offensive. There now

appeared on the arena an enemy who was trying by means of counter-attacks, to smash the strategic plan of the Soviet Command. A question of the greatest importance to our study now arises: is it possible to elaborate a strategic plan foreseeing and providing for every possible reaction on the part of the enemy? It is obvious that it is impossible to foresee the enemy's actions with absolute accuracy. The disposition of the enemy reserves and other known data about enemy forces may give some idea of the enemy's possible courses of action, but there is no guarantee that the enemy will adopt any particular decision in preference to another. The enemy may even adopt an incorrect, unjustified decision. In war one must always expect surprises, the appearance of new circumstances, of rapid changes in the situation. The strategic plan should be fixed, but at the same time it should also be sufficiently flexible. Although its essence may not be changed, certain details will inevitably be altered in the course of the engagement.

The essence, the basic element of the plan is expressed by the strategic objective. A plan may be altered in its details, but the strategic objective remains unaltered until its attainment. If the objective, too, is changed, the plan was an incorrect one and the initiative passed into the enemy's hands. Firm pursuit of the set objective, the concentration of all the efforts of the troops on this objective is the guarantee of victory. It is an advantage that ensures the most profitable disposition of forces in battle. It is a law in war that purposeful and, consequently, firmly directed, deliberately organized actions in an engagement gain the upperhand over actions that are ill-organized and haphazard. This advantage is so great that it makes it possible to defeat even a numerically superior enemy.

The firm pursuit of a set goal is of importance even in peaceful life. But in war it is the condition sine qua non. In war the situation is never absolutely clear, there always remain certain unknown elements concerning the enemy's intentions and actions. Those troops that enter into battle without being prepared to overcome unexpected hindrances, difficulties and dangers are but poor troops. As perfect as a strategic plan may be in conception, its tactical execution always brings surprises. The picture of the modern gigantic battle is motley and variable.

It is the will of the commander that invests it with a firm, unshakeable foundation—the strategic objective. This foundation either reduces to nought or considerably weakens the effect of chance on the field of battle. Individual tactical failures lose their significance if success is sustained on the principal sector of the battle.

It goes without saying that the strategic objective must be set correctly to become such a unifying and organizing force. Even when the objective is correctly chosen tremendous will-power and intelligence is required to establish the strategic objective firmly and to concentrate the efforts of the troops on it steadily. Only gradually and often enough even imperceptibly will the enemy be constrained to bow to the will of the commander and will his actions come to depend on this will.

The setting of Stalingrad as the strategic objective is the work of Stalin's genius, the fruit of the working of a brilliant mind and the colossal effort of the commander's will. With every hour Stalingrad dominated more and more strongly over the huge field of battle on the south, subjecting the enemy to its influence. What did the German Command do at the critical moment when its Stalingrad grouping was surrounded? It sent another grouping that had been operating further south, Manstein's grouping, to Stalingrad. It was then that the Germans finally realized that the decision would be made at Stalingrad and that all forces had to be concentrated at this point. Too late! It was too late to do in November what should have been done in July. Their action now no longer signified the concentration, but the disorderly scattering of efforts.

The decisive battle of the war was in progress. Even the simplest people in all corners of the world understood this. The Stalinist strategy pursued the set objective with bold daring, while the Hitlerite strategy dragged in the rear. The joint actions of the German Stalingrad and Kotelnikovo groupings might have endangered the Soviet troops of the Stalingrad Front. But for this the German Command had to resolve to abandon Stalingrad. Hitler could not consent to this. From his own point of view he was right. He already realized that he was hanging over an abyss, clutching only at some bushes. He was advised to loosen his grip. But he did not want

to. To loosen his grip, to abandon the ruins of Stalingrad meant to hurtle down into the abyss for sure, whereas if he held on there was at least a slight chance that he might be saved. Goering promised to free the Stalingrad grouping from the air; Manstein would break the ring of encirclement.

The campaign of 1942 cannot be understood if the important role of the moral factor is not taken into account. For Hitler to issue an order to retreat from Stalingrad meant to sign to his own defeat. Would troops who had been informed of their defeat been capable of withstanding the fierce battles that would have been inevitable in the attempt to break through to Millerovo and Rostov? A retreat of an army 300,000 strong has to be thoroughly prepared. This had not been done. The German troops were encircled, and if they had emerged from their reliable fortifications into the open field they would have been attacked on all sides by our troops. But the Kotelnikovo grouping, too, had to be concentrated and prepared for battle. Time was needed, but time was the one thing the Soviet Command had no intention of presenting to the Germans.

The strategic suddenness of our action had a ruinous effect on the German forces. They were forced to improvise under difficult and dangerous conditions—and this never leads to any good. While confusion reigned supreme among the German leaders, the Soviet Command acted in accordance with a fixed plan.

In this plan the enemy's inevitable reaction was foreseen with inspired clairvoyance. The Hitler Command failed to comprehend the full profundity of the Stalinist scheme and landed from the frying pan into the fire.

There is one remarkable feature about the Stalingrad encircling operation (November 1942): according to the plan, some troops strained towards the objective, Kalach; the troops that entered the breach turned about to face Stalingrad and press the ring of encirclement tighter; other troops turned to the southwest and advanced in the opposite direction which we now have the right to call the Rostov direction.

Three directions for the tactical blows, yet the direction for the main blow was one! This was determined by the strategic objective: Stalingrad. The groups that advanced to the east directly carried out this objective; the

troops that advanced to the west did so for the sake of securing the success of operations. The further away these troops moved from Stalingrad, the more hopeless did the position of the encircled German grouping become.

In December 1942 a bitter battle was fought in the region of the big bend of the Don River. In the region of Tormosino the Germans quickly gathered large forces. They consisted of three field airforce divisions transferred by air, one tank and several infantry divisions. Despite its large numbers, the German Tormosino grouping bore every evidence of improvisation; it contained parts of divisions that had already been crushed. In advancing at the beginning of December it encountered the stubborn resistance of our troops encircling the German Stalingrad grouping.

Meanwhile Manstein's grouping was being formed in the region of Kotelnikovo. Its nucleus consisted of three tank divisions (one of them transferred from France). Infantry and cavalry units also entered into its composition. On 12 December the Germans launched an offensive. The 51st Army of the Stalingrad front, which took up position along the Aksai river, took the first blows upon itself. In the course of the battles, which continued until the end of December, the Germans succeeded in pushing forward along the Stalingrad direction, but the Soviet Command, making use of its reserves, concentrated another army—the 2nd Guards' Army—in this region. Our troops went over to the offensive, crushed the German Kotelnikovo grouping and on 28 December broke into Kotelnikovo.

The advance of our troops to the southwest and the introduction of large forces in the region of the ring of encirclement made it possible to repel the German counter-attacks. At this time the strategic situation grew much worse for the Germans. On 16 December the troops of the South-Western Front, under the command of Colonel-General Vatutin, launched an offensive in the region of the middle reaches of the Don, assisted by the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Lieutenant-General Golikov. Advancing from two sectors: Novaya Kalitva—Monastyrshchina and from the region of Bokovskaya, our troops surrounded and destroyed the 8th Italian Army and, con-

tinuing their rapid advance to the southeast, captured Tatsinskaya on 24 December.

This was a crushing new blow for the Germans on the Rostov direction. Primarily, however, it ensured the attainment of the objective: Stalingrad. A second ring of encirclement was formed far in the rear of the German troops. The troops of the South-Western Front penetrated into the rear of the Tormosino grouping, while the troops of the Stalingrad Front, attacking from the east, captured Tormosino. There was but one thing left for the German Command to do: to hastily remove the units not yet surrounded and destroyed to the west.

What conclusion may be drawn from the course of the engagement in December? The German Command, stunned by the suddenness of the attacks of the Soviet troops, acted in a disorderly manner, hastily improvising counter-attacks. It cannot be said that its only object was to break through the ring of encirclement. It also aimed to retain Stalingrad at any cost. This aim was a vicious and hopeless one, the result of the collapse of the German strategic plan, whose fragments Hitler still clutched.

The pincers of the Stalinist strategy moved together more and more implacably. We repeat: on a number of sectors at various times the tactical situation was dangerous for our troops. But while carrying out its daring plan, our Stalinist strategy took every measure to ensure success. Its clear purposefulness made the position of our troops increasingly stable, while it created ever new threats to the German troops.

Our Commander consistently and steadily led our troops to the achievement of the main purpose: to surround and destroy the main enemy grouping in the region of Stalingrad. This meant winning the general engagement that had begun in July. The main direction of the blows was the Stalingrad direction. But to achieve this decisive objective, the Stalinist strategy delivered brilliantly-planned blows in the direction of Rostov. The designation: Stalingrad—Rostov expressed a single strategic objective. A remarkable feature of this situation was that the nearer our troops moved to Rostov, the more secure was the principal scheme of surrounding and routing the German Stalingrad grouping.

It would be a distortion of history to say that at first the Soviet Command set the ob-

jective of surrounding the Germans in the region of Stalingrad and then after surrounding them, set the objective of advancing upon Rostov. The very point is that the attacks on the Rostov direction that ensured the success of the main operation, were planned and prepared before 19 November. They constituted the links of a single strategic plan. Irrefutable proof that this was the case was the distribution of the strategic reserves destined to carry out both the main operation and to ensure its blows. The objective "Stalingrad—Rostov" was set before the Soviet offensive was launched and was consistently pursued in the course of the offensive.

The reader remembers the three factors determining the objective: Stalingrad. The time has come to add a new, fourth factor, established in the process of analyzing the offensive operations. It should be remembered that we are dealing with a single strategic objective and that we are continuing to expound the three above-mentioned phases. Thus: fourthly, in order to ensure the encirclement and rout of the German grouping in the region of Stalingrad, it was necessary to inflict consistent blows and advance on the Rostov direction, to destroy the German troops east of the Boguchari—Millerovo—Rostov line, to take Rostov, to liberate the territory seized by the Germans in the summer of 1942, and to reestablish the lines of communication linking the centre with the South.

It is clear that these factors enter into the decisive objective. To be sure, Stalingrad was of decisive significance in the campaign of 1942—1943. But the taking of Rostov was part of the Stalingrad objective. This was all one, a single strategic objective.

The Germans were surrounded in the region of Stalingrad. But they were threatened by a second encirclement on the Rostov direction. The threat paralyzed all their attempts to rescue their encircled grouping. We have already spoken of our blow from the north to the south. But even on the eve of 19 November the Germans received a formidable blow from the south in the region of Vladikavkaz. In January 1943 our troops in the North Caucasus launched an offensive. On 3 January they took Mozdok, and on 11 January they captured Mineralniye Vody.

All along the front in the region of the salient east of Boguchari—Rostov our troops

were now advancing in the general direction of Rostov. This sealed the doom of the encircled German grouping in the region of Stalingrad. This also predetermined the liberation of Rostov. The colossal engagement begun in the South in June 1942 had been strategically won by the Red Army.

As remarkable as were the actions of our troops in the January operation to exterminate the encircled German grouping in the region of Stalingrad, we cannot describe them in detail.

The extermination of the German-fascist troops encircled in the region of Stalingrad was carried out by the forces of the Don Front under the Command of Colonel-General Rokossovski. The artillery offensive was directed by Marshal of Artillery, Voronov, representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The airforces were directed by Colonel-General Novikov and Lieutenant-General of Aviation Golovanov. The valorous 62nd Army, under the command of Lieutenant-General Chuikov, also took part in the last phase of the Stalingrad engagement.

In this operation the predetermined strategic victory was tactically completed. What bears directly on our subject, however, are the figures showing the huge numbers and powerful armament of the encircled grouping. By 23 November 1942 approximately 330,000 enemy troops or 22 divisions were encircled near Stalingrad. After the extermination of the encircled grouping 24 generals, headed by a Field Marshal, and more than 2,500 officers were taken prisoner. In the period from 10 January to 2 February alone our troops captured the following trophies: 1,550 tanks, 6,700 guns, 1,462 mortar guns, 8,135 machine guns, etc.

How such a powerful grouping could allow itself to be encircled and destroyed remains a riddle if approached from a narrowly tactical point of view. This riddle can be explained only if considered from the strategic aspect.

In the campaign of 1942 the Germans in the south possessed superiority in man-power, in tanks and aircraft. However, in view of the gigantic scale of modern engagements, it is the correct and expedient utilisation of troops on the whole theatre of war that is of

decisive significance, and to ensure this is the task of strategic leadership.

While Hitler's gambling strategy scattered his efforts and pursued fantastic, unreal objectives, the Stalinist strategy set a correct, lucid objective, concentrating the efforts of all the troops and the entire country on its achievement. One extremely important circumstance in this respect should be borne in mind. The Supreme High Command of the Red Army discovered the objectives of the enemy in good time and parried all attempts to attain them. The German Command, on the contrary, did not see and did not understand the objectives set by the Stalinist strategy. The reason for this lay not only in the disdain in which the Germans customarily held their army, but also in the profundity and originality of the Stalinist scheme.

When they became involved in the battle for Stalingrad it never occurred to the Germans that they might find themselves pinned in the region of Stalingrad.

When our offensive began on 19 November, 1942, the Germans refused even to consider that the matter might end with the encirclement and destruction of so numerous a grouping.

In attempting, by extremely stereotyped means, to break the ring of encirclement, the Germans never suspected that new blows were being prepared for them.

The Germans were dazzled by their tactical successes. They were blind in regard to the plans of the Soviet Command. They acted blindly. The operations of our troops, on the other hand, were directed in the light of Stalinist strategy. The advantages of one who sees over one who is blind are obvious.

It was not chance that the Germans found themselves fighting under conditions unfavourable to them; it was not chance that at every given moment they failed to utilize all their forces. Step by step they slid down to defeat.

The extermination of the encircled German grouping in the region of Stalingrad was completed on 2 February 1943 and Rostov was taken on 14 February.

The strategic objective—Stalingrad—Rostov—was fully achieved tactically as well.

The brilliant Stalinist scheme was accomplished.

RECENT WORK OF SOVIET ANTHROPOLOGY

By Prof. A. Bunak

I

ANCIENT PEOPLES AND THEIR ORIGIN

THE DISCOVERY of the skeleton of a fossil man in Teshik-Tash Grotto in the mountains of Central Asia (Southern Bukhara) represents one of the most important anthropological finds of recent years.

Southern Bukhara lies in the Hissar Mountains. Teshik-Tash Grotto is located in the Zautolos Sai Canyon of the Beissen-Tad Mountains (belonging to the Hissar Range). This grotto is at an altitude of sixteen hundred metres above sea level, is seven by twenty metres in area and has an entrance seven metres high. The central area of the grotto represents a fossil-bearing layer containing pieces of animal bones, worked stone, and coal deposits superimposed on a porous layer of clay. Underneath the clay lies another fossil-bearing stratum. Altogether there are five strata with a total thickness of about one and a half meters, forty centimetres of which contain fossils.

In 1938 Soviet archeologist Okladnikov discovered the remains of a human skeleton at the base of the first layer at a depth of twenty-five centimetres. The skull lay in a suppression in the non-fossil-bearing layer. The horns of mountain goats arranged in pairs were found within the immediate vicinity of the suppression. Heaps of coal and remnants of fires were found in several places in the fossil-bearing layer. Okladnikov concludes

that burials accompanied by ritual took place here. The alteration of fossil-bearing and sterile strata indicates beyond doubt that the Teshik-Tash Grotto was not permanently inhabited. And it is evident from the thickness of the non-fossil-bearing strata that the intervals between the use of the grotto were very long.

The geological study of the canyon and grotto yields little for the determination of the epoch to which the fossil-bearing strata of Teshik-Tash belong, but in any case there is nothing to preclude the supposition that they belong to the Pleistocene period.

The fossil-bearing strata contain many fragments of bones. According to V. I. Gromova, the following types of mammals are represented: the Siberian goat (*capra Sibirica*), the horse (*equus caballus*), wild bear (*sus scrofa*), leopard (*felis pardus*), marmot (*marmotta*), and the pika (*ochotona*). The remains of mountain goats are the most numerous. In general the composition of the fauna is similar to that of the present day. According to Gromova's supposition, orographic, climatic and fauna conditions in this part of Central Asia have changed little since the end of the Pleistocene Period.

Interesting stone implements were also found here. They were made, for the most part, of local siliceous limestone and some of quartz and quartzite. One implement was made of pure limestone. The first fossil-bearing stratum contains many so-called corea, most notable of which are long massive oval implements with broad sides and thick round

ends fashioned by chipping with a sharp instrument. Flatter scrapers of various forms, sharp pointed tools with primitive designs have also been discovered. Chips and flat pieces of stone for making implements are in abundance. There is a complete absence of objects made of bone and horn. In Okladnikov's opinion, Teshik-Tash stone technology fully corresponds to European early Mousterian culture. Okladnikov notes the great similarity between Teshik-Tash stone technology and well-known examples of Middle Paleolithic relics discovered in Palestine, as well as in southern Kurdistan (Hatsar-Merl cave).

The remains of the human skeleton were brought to the Anthropological Museum of the Moscow State University. Considerable fragments of the femur, the tibia, the humerus, and both collar bones were in a fair state of preservation. The skull was smashed into more than one hundred and fifty pieces, but all of them were well-preserved and it was possible to restore almost completely the cranium and face skeleton. This reconstruction was brilliantly executed by the sculptor and anthropologist M. M. Gerasimov. Scientific research work on the bones was conducted by Professor Debetz, Professor Gremitsky (the skull), Assistant professor Sinelnikov (bones of skeleton), Professor Bunak (cast of brain region) and others. The results of this work are set forth in a comprehensive monograph now in press.

A first examination revealed that the Teshik-Tash skeleton was that of an eight or nine year-old child, probably a boy.

The cranial capacity is great, but the vault of the skull is comparatively low, with slanted frontal regions, angular occiput, prominent superciliary ridges which are pushed back by the position of the occiput aperture, and massive bones. The upper jaw has a flat front wall. The chin region is little developed, the teeth are large. A plaster cast of the brain cavity reveals, among others, the following characteristics: a slanting templar region with rather angular poles; a wide fissure between the cerebellum hemispheres; impressions of convolutions of the brain as far as the frontal protuberances; a central frontal furrow with a horizontal posterior protuberance.

These characteristics do not identify the skeleton with any variation of modern man even at the lowest stage of his development, but relate the Teshik-Tash skull to the type

of fossil man belonging to the end of the Pleistocene Period, the Middle Paleolithic, or, broadly, "Neanderthaloid".

This conclusion is beyond doubt, but from the modern point of view it is insufficient. Middle Paleolithic includes many different human types, such as the typical European Neanderthal, the fossil from Ngandong in Java, from various places in Africa and Palestine. The question arises as to which of these types the Teshik-Tash skeleton most resembles. But, perhaps it represents a unique variation? The features of the Teshik-Tash skeleton might point to either of these suppositions. The extreme youth of the Teshik-Tash relic renders it difficult to draw a final conclusion as there is insufficient comparative material for that age. Comparative research in new data, especially the Palestine discoveries, will probably render it possible to clear up this interesting question. Nevertheless, even now the Teshik-Tash discovery is of great interest. First of all it greatly extends the area in which Middle Paleolithic man existed. All relics known heretofore were discovered at comparatively short distances from the sea. The Teshik-Tash skeleton is the first reliable proof of the penetration of Middle Paleolithic man into the interior of the Asiatic continent. Proof that man lived in high mountainous regions is of great importance. The Teshik-Tash skeleton provides valuable material for the investigation of the variations of the "Neanderthaloid" type and for the study of age peculiarities of ancient man.

A valuable monograph by G. A. Bonch-Osmolovsky entitled *The Hand of Paleolithic Man* was published in 1941 just before the war. It treats of another most important relic of fossil man—the skeleton of a hand found in the Kink-Koba grotto in the Crimea. Considerable literature has been written about this discovery, but a comparative anthropological study of the skeleton, the skull of which is unfortunately missing, required many years of persevering work. The published monograph treats only of the bones of the hand and is a work of exceptional value as the author is the first to have collected exhaustive material about the structural peculiarities of this important part of the skeleton of modern man, fossil man, and of various groups of *Cercopithecus* monkeys. As the result of careful measurements and reconstruction G. A. Bonch-Osmolovsky notes the following peculiarities of

the skeleton of the hand of the Kink-Koba man: relative elongation of the fourth and fifth fingers; very broad carpus, metacarpus and phalanges, especially the extreme phalanges, which give the hand a peculiar flattened form; the flatness of certain joints which extend more horizontally giving rise to the conclusion that the Kink-Koba man was little able to bend his fingers palmward but better able to move them sidewise. The position of the thumb is most peculiar as the joint of the first metacarpal bone is very slightly developed. The author believes that the ability of this fossil man to move his thumb towards the palm was greatly restricted. The general impression gained is of a wide flat paw-like hand. The Kink-Koba relic is the first to have been studied in such detail and so systematically, but Bonch-Osmolovsky concludes that many of the above-enumerated features are inherent to some degree in skeletons of the European Neanderthal man. At the same time the author proves convincingly that the above-described structural type of hand is not similar to that of anthropoid apes but, on the contrary, has developed away from them in the opposite direction.

On the whole, the Kink-Koba man had a human hand and could make various stone implements.

Regarding the paw-like hand as the original form in the evolution of man, partially repeated in the individual development of modern man, Bonch-Osmolovsky concludes that primitive man's locomotion was not like that of modern anthropoid apes.

The latter are clearly a side branch. The distant ancestors of man were adapted to a different type of locomotion, were less specifically tree forms and according to the structure of the hand were closer to the modern ground monkeys of the Pavian type. This conclusion is supported by interesting facts concerning the type of locomotion of the various primates, the development of the grasping ability in a child, and other data.

Naturally Bonch-Osmolovsky's conclusions cannot be regarded as proved beyond doubt, especially those giving general characteristics of the hand of fossil man. The necessary data for this are lacking. The problem of the relation of various forms of Middle Paleolithic man and the modern type is still not solved. However, Bonch-Osmolovsky's hypothesis that anthropoid apes and their specific type

of grasping hand are the result of a new branch developing in a definite direction within the species is shared by many modern authorities. It is quite possible that the hand structure of Miocene primates (to which both human and anthropoid branches trace their origin) not only lacked the distinctive features of anthropoid apes but was closer to the modern semi-ground types of primates. In developing this view Bonch-Osmolovsky contributed new material of outstanding importance for studying the evolution of man.

The wide dispersal of *Neoanthropus* at the end of the Pleistocene period and the disappearance of the ancient form (*Paleoanthropus*) is testified to by many discoveries in various parts of the world. What were the factors which ensured the predominance of *Neanthropus*? This problem has been taken up in a number of works, some published and some still in press. The views developed by P. P. Efimenko deserve first mention here. In one of the chapters of his book *Primitive Society* (1938) Efimenko noted the significance of strict endogamy (intertribal marriage) which existed in the small herds of the Mousterian epoch for the fixation of the specific features of the Neanderthal type. The appearance of the new type was conditioned by the formation of broader social groups, the beginnings of gentile organization. This view deserves the most serious attention although P. P. Efimenko treated the Neanderthal features in a very narrow manner, perceiving in them only signs of degeneration. Actually it is not degeneration one should perceive but rather specialization.

S. P. Tolstov and A. Boriskovsky stress the great part played in the evolution of man by the development of hunting and technology in the Middle Paleolithic period. Indeed, collective hunting is a most important stimulus to the development of new forms of intercourse among humans, their uniting in large groups, the invention of call signals, the creation of new tools, the acquisition of new materials (horn, bone), radical alterations in diet, etc. The further investigation of these problems is imperative.

A very interesting view was expressed by Y. Y. Roginsky, who noted that the small Neanderthal groups themselves presented obstacles to their further development. Unless he was restrained by social motives or self-control, the club- and stone-armed Neanderthal

man represented a considerable threat to his fellows in various conflicts for the female and for food.

The development of these two means of restraint are most typical of the *Meanthropus*. They are closely connected with the development of the brain, especially the frontal region, the formation of which marks the last stage in the physical evolution of man.

A study of casts of the brain cavity of Neanderthal man stresses the importance of other elements of cranial structure. One of the most striking features of the *Paleanthropus* is the very slanting templar region, the high temporal ridge resulting in the feeble development of the lower parietal region (i. e. the region with which conscious speech is connected). Considering that the general brain cavity of the Neanderthal man was no smaller than that of modern man, then the conclusion of the author of these lines that a certain reconstruction of the cranium and the development of speech are the most outstanding characteristics of the later stages in the development of man is readily understood. This view is in complete accord with the teaching of Academician Marr on the development of speech and leads one to believe that the Neanderthal man possessed only slight powers of speech.

II

MODERN RACES AND THEIR HISTORY

The anthropological study of the numerous nationalities of the Soviet Union provides a key to the solution of many cardinal problems of race formation and race systematization. Soviet scientists have always striven to extend anthropological research to all the ethnic groupings within their country.

In recent years anthropological knowledge of Siberia and the Far East has been increased by extensive research among various groups of natives of the Okhotsk seacoast (by M. G. Levin), of the Amur River region (D. A. Zolotarev), among the Nentsi Samoyeds of northwestern Siberia (S. A. Shluger), the Keshms, a small folk on the upper banks of the Yenisei River (G. F. Debets), the Hants and the Mansi or Ostyaks and Voguls of the lower Ob River (T. A. Trofimov and N. P. Cheboksarov), the Selkups of the lower

Ob (G. F. Debets) and others. The material thus obtained has greatly enriched and rendered more exact existing information about racial types in Asia. It is becoming evident that the most characteristic type for the Asiatic continent, the so-called Mongoloid type, is far from homogeneous. Within this category exist many variations which are either local types or relics of ancient racial formations.

The dolio- or mesocephalic Asiatic anthropological types are widely scattered over Siberia and the Far East. Variations are to be found at present among the Trans-Baikal Tunguses, in places along the Amur River among the Golds, and on the Okhotsk Sea coast. It is necessary to investigate the relation of this doubtlessly more ancient anthropological type of Central and Eastern Siberia to the mesocephalic variation of western Siberia, the so-called Urals racial type. At present these two variations possess certain common features, but at the same time there are essential differences in the form of the face, and nose, as well as in other respects. The latest research shows that racial characteristics commonly attributed to Asiatic races—coarse hair, heavy upper eyelids with the oriental fold at the inside corner, flat faces, etc.—do not prevail among the native population of Siberia. If, in respect to southern Siberians, especially Turkish folks, one may assume the blending of European elements in the formation of their type, such an assumption is out of the question regarding the more northern Siberian groups. Among the latter in some districts there is a definite aquiline nose somewhat resembling that of the North American Indian. Is this type the result of actual genetical relations, however remote? Is this Siberian aquiline nose peculiar to an independent group? Is the aquiline nose merely a secondary trait which arose through the convergent development of separate, isolated groups? These problems look for solution within the next few years.

Much new anthropological information has been obtained about the peoples of Central Asia, especially through the craniological study of medieval and older ethnic groups (the works of V. Ginsburg and others). More and more do facts indicate that the doliocephalic element of European appearance is widespread in Central Asia and that modern anthropological variations, among which the

brachycephalic element is prevalent, are of later formation.

In the Caucasus anthropological research has been conducted for several years by many experts, as a result of which a great deal of comparative material has been obtained. Most of this extensive country has been investigated by districts, with the exception of certain regions in Daghestan and in the most mountainous regions of Georgia. The drawing of anthropological maps of the Caucasus is one of the few experiments made in anthropological analysis by districts based upon systematic observations made by groups of research workers. A summary of this data will be published in a special collection about the Caucasus, now being prepared for press by the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences. New materials have corrected and complemented former views concerning anthropological types in the Caucasus. The existence of the mesocephalic long-faced type with straight nose, dark hair, often with blue or grey eyes, has been established in the northwestern Caucasus. This type is to be found among the Cherkess-Kabardinian peoples in the Kuban region and is clearly a variation of the so-called Pontic race—a special branch of the Mediterranean race. Morphological and historical data establish the unity of the Kuban variation of the Pontic race with lower Danube types in Bulgaria, ancient types in present-day southern Russia, and others. In ancient times the above-described type was very widespread and predominated in what is now western Georgia. In the southeastern Transcaucasus there is another, also mesocephalic type, but it differs from the first in several respects. This type is to be found among Azerbaijanians, among a small folk called the Tats (remnants of the ancient Iranian inhabitants of this region), the Talishes, the Kurds and others. The Transcaucasian mesocephalic type along with the mesocephalic variation prevalent among the Trans-Caspian Turkmenians comprise a special race, the Caspian race, which is also a branch of the great Mediterranean race. Some groups in northern Iran also belong to the Caspian type. A third racial type, Pontozagros or Armenoid, is found in the central Transcaucasian highlands. This type is composed of several elements, some of more ancient origin than others. The region through which the Pontozagros type is

distributed includes districts of southern Daghestan.

The three above-described racial types are widespread outside the Caucasus also. A fourth type, called the Caucasian race proper, is specific for the Caucasus. This type is similar to the Armenoid but is characterized by a narrower head and a slightly different form of face and nose. This type is found in Georgia and partially in the central Terek region in the North Caucasus. The results of the anthropological analysis of the population of the Caucasus fully accord with the latest data of archeology, linguistics, ethnography and make it possible to trace the history of modern ethnic types.

In recent years the racial analysis of the population of the European part of the Soviet Union has also advanced considerably.

A series of Neolithic skulls found in the Olonets Lake on Oleni Island and described by the Leningrad anthropologist V. Zhirov is of great importance in the study of the anthropology of the North. This series includes a slightly brachycephalic element which is somewhat similar to the Lopar type but which differs from the latter by virtue of certain "Mongoloid" features. The great age of this variation on the territory of northern Europe is beyond doubt. The connection between this element and the northern forest Neoliths is also evident. The Neolithic brachycephalics of the North should occupy a place of their own. There is no data which justifies identifying them with the western European Neolithic brachycephalic types of Borreby, Denmark and Grenel, France.

A volume of the works of the Institute of Anthropology of the Moscow State University published in 1941 contains a number of essays on the anthropology of various Finnish peoples (articles by Debets, Zenkevich, Gremyatsky). As has been noted by previous investigators anthropologically the Finnish peoples are not homogeneous. Baltic racial types are clearly distinguished among the Ladoga Finns, for example, among the small group of Veps, while the Volga Marii (Cheremis) are a variation of the Ural type and the Udmurts (Votyaks) contain elements close to the Lopar type. In the opinion of the above-mentioned authors it is to be expected that certain Finnish groups contain the neutral proto-Asiatic anthropological element or even more definitely Mongoloid elements. Such an

anthropological type is outlined in craniological material belonging to the Iron Age (the skull from Lugov grave belonging to Ananen culture).

In addition to ordinary anthropological investigation certain other studies of elementary genetic features were conducted among the Finnish tribes—blood groups, reaction in a pheniltiocarbamide solution and especially colour sensitivity. The groups investigated proved very similar in these respects.

Work on the craniology of ancient Slav tribes is systematically being conducted by T. A. Trofimova. This author notes differences among the Southern Slav group of Severyans and the more northern Kriviches and Vyatiches. The former belong to the doliocephalic variation, a Pontic form. The author believes that among the latter, along with other elements, there are Asiatic or proto-Asiatic elements.

Several volumes by G. F. Debets treating of the craniology of the population of Russia in the epoch preceding the present one has been prepared for press. The author has named his book *The Paleoanthropology of the U. S. S. R.* But he includes in it osteological materials belonging not only to the Stone Age or the prehistoric period in general, but to all later ages up to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The author has collected a huge quantity of exhaustive craniological material preserved in central and local museums, all of which has been carefully checked in respect to dates and classified according to epochs and territories. This comprehensive summary gives a good picture of the craniological types and their alterations beginning with the neolithic period until modern times through wide sections of eastern Europe, Siberia and Central Asia. These data contain irreplaceable original material necessary for the solution of many anthropological problems in the U. S. S. R. The author devotes much attention to the local transformation of craniological types which occurred in many territories and takes into consideration, at the same time, the change of types which took place as a result of the immigration of separate groups of the ancient population of the country.

Along with materials about Eastern Europe the above-mentioned volume of the works of the Institute of Anthropology contains articles by N. K. Cheboksarov on racial types in modern Germany. Based upon the careful study of

all the factual material in literature, this work is a most complete and systematic summary greatly superior to anything on this subject heretofore printed. Cheboksarov's work corrects many widespread views concerning the racial composition of the population of Germany. While re-affirming the formerly expressed view concerning the limited distribution of the North European racial type proper and the preponderance of Baltic and Central European types in northern Germany, the author goes on to point out that the Alpine type is also not the main element of which the present population of southern Germany is composed. This type spreads over a very small region. At the same time the existence of a peculiar complex of distinctive features which the author classifies with the Atlantic racial form Deneker has been established in the upper Rhine zone. The systematic study of concrete anthropological material convincingly exposes the mistakes in method, the extreme primitiveness as well as the out-of-date materials of the well-known anthropological diagram of Günther and other German race specialists.

As for the attempts of Günther and his followers to discover anthropological data proving their so-called "racial" theory, experts have long since proved the futility of their efforts. In this sphere there is no longer any room for scientific discussion at present. All that is necessary is to lodge a sharp protest against the deliberate falsification of scientific data, against its crude vulgarization and the use of philistine terms and views.

The great advance in the modern theory of race formation and race analysis as compared with previous views is evident from the above review. The human race is not something unchangeable. In the course of ages the various distinctive features of human groups alter: the size of the population within which marriages among members take place grows or diminishes. As a result, the concentration of various hereditary features varies and under certain conditions changes take place in the average size of the group. At the same time changes in external conditions influence one and the same tendency. The influence of inter-group marriage, as well as group isolation should be added to these two general factors of racial differentiation.

Considering these facts it would be incorrect to draw a line for racial types based on

the absolute existence of one or another trait, or even of several traits. Observing the changes of features within a certain territory one can see that these changes are very gradual, for example, the region with the highest head index is surrounded by a zone where this index is slightly lower, and so forth. The region where a certain feature is most clear is evidently that region where certain hereditary traits are most concentrated, or as it is usually called, the "centre of distribution". The entire zone within which the trait alters in one direction (plus or minus) comprises the region of the distribution of one type, despite the difference in the magnitude of the fact. The boundaries of the type are located where the alteration is in the opposite direction, i. e., where instead of finding a reduction of the average index it begins to increase.

But for races the combination of several features on a given territory is always characteristic, as for example, blue eyes, wide heads, tallness. The boundaries of the distribution of the racial type are located where the given combination of features is replaced by another, for example, an increase in height when considered according to territory is accompanied by a darkening of eye color. The race, as a systematic category, is far from being the only taxonomic category. It is necessary to distinguish great races, simply races, sub-races, local races. In such a consecutive subdivision the dynamic essence of the category "race" is revealed. A most important criterion in determining the race or sub-race is the alteration of features according to territory. Those races which by anthropological analysis have been re-constructed in the modern epoch reflect groups which arose in the distant past. Evidently the types of great races arose in the neolithic period. Outlines of the most primitive forms of some races are found in the metal age.

Such are the general views in the study of the race as a historical and dynamic category formulated by Soviet anthropology and developed in the above-mentioned works as well as in a number of special investigations (about alterations in the length of the body, in the form of the skull, the general conditions of the alteration of the average index in population, the correlation of ethnic and somatic types, etc.).

Among the latest works on general problems in the study of races it is necessary to

mention a series of mathematical investigations conducted by M. V. Ignatyev, concerning the significance of cross breeding, isolation, the conditions of the distribution of newly arising traits. Y. Y. Roginsky investigated the distribution of blood groups among men from the same viewpoint.

In the study of the geographical distribution of variations of skin patterns of the fingers N. V. Volotskoi used the "delta index" which expresses the total number of so-called deltas per ten fingers. Putting the magnitudes of this index on world geographical maps revealed most important and more or less constant differences in racial groups.

III

VARIATIONS IN THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN BODIES

The study of the physical type of ancient man and human races is usually regarded as the main content of anthropological science. However, no less characteristic for this science is wide research in the variation of structure and the laws determining these variations. Only on the basis of a knowledge of ontogenetic alterations, the laws of correspondence and growth of parts of the body and comparative anatomy, can correct racial analyses be made and the earlier stages of the evolution of man explained. With the increase in anthropological knowledge, the number of concrete morphological problems grows. Much attention is paid not only to research in the variations of the structure of the skull and individual bones of the skeleton but also to the brain convolutions, the skin and hair, the bones and cartilage, the nose, eyelids, lips, muscles, internal organs and outer forms of the body, the proportion of its parts.

In recent years a number of works in comparative anatomical research, the study of topographical and functional correlations, ontogenetic alterations and the laws of growth have been published.

In the period from birth to approximately twenty years of age, the growth of individual organs and parts of the body differs in respect of speed and length of time. For the organism in general the growth of the total size of the body, its length, weight and chest measurement is most characteristic. These measure-

ments determine the size of the body surface and its volume. Available data establish a definite relation between the increase of the total size of the body and its separate parts.

As is known, during the growth period there are three to four years during which the annual increase in the total size of the body is very great. Some experts regard this so-called puberty phase in boys as extending from the ages of eleven to fifteen and others from twelve to seventeen. An analysis of charts seems to indicate that puberty comes between thirteen and seventeen years for boys and thirteen and sixteen for girls. In comparing such widely differing groups in respect to body size as the Japanese and Americans, it is seen that variations in the above-mentioned periods are no more than four to six months. At the same time another important circumstance becomes evident: a sharp increase in growth during puberty is characteristic for only one type. If growth is very intensive preceding puberty then the intensity of growth during the period of sexual maturing is hardly noticeable. On this basis it was possible to distinguish several types of growth and to find basic magnitudes according to which it is possible to establish the type of growth of the child in a comparatively short period of observation. There is hardly any relation between the type of growth and the final size

of the body. Both short and tall persons may grow according to the accelerated as well as the gradual type. At the same time it becomes clear that between the final size and magnitude of the body at one or another age there is a relation which varies within comparatively narrow limits. Besides being of great interest for understanding the formative process of an organism, the establishment of these laws is most important for the correct estimation of the physical development of the child by the school doctor. In this respect theoretical anthropological research is closely connected with applied anthropometry.

Research in the physical development of various groups of children is most important and has become the subject of numerous theses written by medical workers. The anthropometrical study of the sizes and proportions of bodies was necessary for the standardization of sizes for army clothing, gas masks etc. A most important role was played by anthropometrical work in controlling methods of physical therapy in treating wounds.

Soviet anthropologists have designed special apparatuses and drawn up special instructions for measuring the mobility of joints and the strength of restored muscles. By helping in the solution of a number of other problems, Soviet anthropology has contributed its share to the great struggle of the people against German fascism.

THE FORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN STATE¹

By Academician B. Grekov

WHERE precise knowledge ends, legends are bound to arise. It is not by mere chance that the origin of most states is obscured in legend. It is impossible to determine the exact moment when a definite state form appeared in any nation and yet interest in this moment, so important in the life of every people, has always been very keen.

When a German chronicler of the second half of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century had to describe the origins of the English state he reproduced the legend of how the Britons appealed to Hengest and Horsa, brother chieftains of Anglo-Saxon bands, with the characteristic message: "Terram latam et spatirosam et omnium rerum copia refertam vestrae mandant ditiori parere²," i. e., the Britons entrusted their large domains and all the abundance thereon to the rule of these two brothers. It is not difficult to draw a parallel here with the legendary formula of the invitation extended to the Varangians to come to Russ: "Vast is our land and full of plenty... Come ye to rule over us."

The English historian Green states, "It is with the landing of Hengest and his war-band at Ebbsfleet on the shores of the Isle of Thanet that English history begins. No spot in Britain can be so sacred to Englishmen as that which first felt the tread of English feet³." Green was a contemporary of S. Solovyev who wrote practically the same thing about the origin of the Russian state, and most certainly without knowledge of what Green had written. Solovyev's words were: "The invitation to the first princes is of great significance in our history. It is an event that affected all of Russia and it is only proper to begin Russian

¹ A Report delivered at a meeting of the Department of History and Philosophy of the U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences on June 18, 1945 held in connection with the 220th anniversary of the Academy.

² A. Kunik. *S. Gedeonov and His System*. P. 61.

³ Green. *A Short History of the English People*. L. 1876, p. 7.

history with it. It is the first step in the founding of the state¹..."

There can be no doubt that the question of the origin of a state is an extremely complex one and yet it is one that cannot be left unanswered. The extent to which these answers are correct and convincing always depends on the level achieved by historical research.

We have no intention whatever of scratching out the names of Hengest and Horsa or Rurik and his brothers from the pages of history. It was not they, however, who were the creators and founders of the English and Russian states.

A state does not arise when heroes capable of creating it appear on the scene. A state becomes a historical necessity at a certain stage in the development of society, precisely at that time when classes appear, when a strong economic and political class takes power into its hands and sets up a state body by means of which it rules. From that moment a state is born. Consequently, in order to solve the problem of the origin of any state it is necessary to re-establish the history of that people in the preceding period and to determine its social system.

On the other hand we know that the history of every people is a part of universal history, the specific features of certain periods of which we should not overlook since they comprise the historical environment in which the life of the given people passed, the environment which to a great extent determined their development.

It is therefore necessary to know two things in order to solve the problem of the origin of one or another state. It is necessary to know: 1) the extent to which the social relations of the given people were developed and 2) the worldwide conditions prevailing in the period under question.

¹ S. Solovyev. *The History of Russia from Ancient Times*. I, p. 103

The history of mankind is divided into definite periods: ancient, medieval and modern. Marxism does not deny this division, it merely defines it more precisely. The distinction between each period is made on the basis of the productive forces and production relations characterising each of them. Ancient history is that period in the history of man when the leading states lived by exploiting slave labour; during the medieval period the prevailing form of labour was that of the feudal peasant, while in modern times it is that of the so-called free worker. Thus, the ancient state was a state of slaveholders; the medieval state one of feudal lords.

It is also necessary to take into consideration the transitional periods, which are in themselves extremely interesting.

Contemporary European states took form and shape during the period of the decline of antiquity. They were created by the peoples living in lands bordering on the Roman Empire. The Greeks and Romans usually called them barbarians. Among these "barbarian" peoples were the Slavonic tribes including Eastern Slavs—the ancestors of the Russian people.

The circumstances under which the medieval states came into being were very complicated. Two worlds stood facing each other. One, a slaveholding state was feeble and dying; the other was young, brimming with energy and hope. The first possessed an old civilisation, the second had not yet reached a full appreciation of this culture but possessed all the requisites for doing so eventually. These two worlds were separated by an abyss of hatred and enmity. Euripides clearly expressed the slaveholders' attitude toward barbarians in the following words: "For the Greek, freedom is an organic requirement. It is not an innate characteristic of the barbarian and is therefore unnecessary for him. This is the reason why the rule of the Hellenes over the barbarians is a law of nature. There can be no equality between the Greek and the barbarian just as there can be no equality between man and a domestic animal." Barbarians are "people created by nature for slavery."

Like many of the people of his own and later ages, Euripides regarded the barbarians as simply a source of slave labour. Plato's statement that there could be no peace between the Greeks and the barbarians was in

complete accordance with such an attitude. The same views were held by the Roman slaveholders. True, the more thoughtful of the Romans began to notice that Rome was suffering from a hopeless malady. By the middle of the first century A. D., Pliny the Elder advanced a diagnosis of the malady that later events proved correct. "Latifundia perdidere Itiam, jam vero et provinces" ("large slaveholding estates ruined Italy and the provinces," i. e., the whole Roman Empire).

As this sad fact became apparent to an ever larger number of Romans, signs of alarm began to appear. Not long before the catastrophe broke over Rome the priest Silvian of Marseilles said, "The Romans (he had in mind the mass of the Roman people—B. G.) have no desire to live under Roman laws... The Roman pleb insists that he be allowed to live with the barbarians." Procopius, the Byzantine historian, noted similar tendencies among the Greeks. "Large numbers of the people," he wrote, "... fled to the barbarians."

What explains the fact that the masses of the Greek and Roman people were drawn toward the barbarians? There is no doubt that they saw some thing in the barbarians' mode of life that attracted them and that did not exist in their own country. It was a simpler social system, progressive for its time, and quite different from the Roman one. In their struggle against the slaveholding state, the barbarians had the support not only of the poorer classes of the Romans but of the masses of slaves, i. e., the barbarians whom the Roman slaveholders had converted into their means of production. The victory won by the "barbarians" was complete—the Roman Empire was utterly crushed. It was crushed throughout its vast domains: in the east where the peoples of the Transcaucasus rose up against the slaveholders, in the northeast where the Slavs took up arms and in the west where the Germanic tribes and the Slavs made their stand. It was in this complicated world situation that the new medieval states took shape and form. The Russian state was no exception to the general rule. Let us turn to facts to prove this.

Until recent times, Kiev Russ with its remarkable culture and civilisation was an inexplicable phenomenon. Indeed, if Russ became a state only in the second half of the ninth century and led a primitive, semi-savage existence up to that time, how was it

possible for the highly civilised Greeks to conclude important treaties with Russ a mere thirty or forty years after the formation of the Russian state, treaties that spoke of serious relations existing between these two countries? When Schlözer studied these treaties he found himself in a quandary—he either had to relinquish his theory of the semi-savage level of life in pre-Varangian Russ or to question the authenticity of these treaties. He chose the latter. He maintained that if these treaties were genuine, then they were the most remarkable documents of all the Middle Ages. Accordingly, he concluded that they were false.

At the present time no one doubts the authenticity of these treaties.

There was another problem that troubled Schlözer—how was it that in the ninth century Russ was able to cope with a task of the greatest difficulty, namely, the writing of its own history in its native tongue? Schlözer himself admitted that the task had been very well done. Nestor, in Schlözer's opinion was the only genuine, complete and impartial chronicler among all his European contemporaries. Schlözer also goes on to say that "Russia is the only nation to possess a chronicle of priceless value not only to itself but to all those interested in history, a chronicle of which it can and should be proud."

There are other well-known facts that puzzled those who accepted the theory that the Russian people were little better than savages in the pre-Rurik period. It is common knowledge, for instance, that the territory of Russ was practically flooded with Oriental coins in the seventh, eighth and ninth centuries. Inasmuch as it is also common knowledge that the then highly-civilised Orient conducted trading operations with semi-barbarian countries in barter and not in money (not a single dirhem has been found on the territory occupied by the Mordavians) it was a question of either admitting that the Oriental merchants considered seventh and eighth century Russ a civilised country, or of inventing some other explanation of the great influx of Oriental silver into Russ.

Thus D. Khvolson, one of the most eminent Russian Orientalists, reluctant to part with the old idea of the savagery of pre-Rurik Russ, hit upon the idea that in the seventh and eighth centuries the Orient stored up silver money which had gone out of

circulation, in order to introduce it into Russia in the ninth century. This hypothesis was highly improbable and offered no real explanation of the facts.

In addition to all these conflicting opinions, historians began to doubt the very possibility of the formation of a state by calling in rulers from the outside.

In brief, Russian historians became more and more aware of the necessity of a reconsideration of the whole problem.

The signal successes achieved by our archeologists not only make this reconsideration doubly necessary but offer much material for a solution of the problem. Written source materials which bear directly or indirectly on the problem, must be interpreted anew in the light of recent archeological discoveries.

A case in point is Procopius's well-known comments on the religion of the Antae. "They consider that only a single god, the creator of lightning (Perun, of course.—B. G.), is the supreme ruler..." Thus by the sixth century the Antae had already attained a conception of a single, all-powerful god, a conception which reflects a highly developed religion. On the basis of ethnographic data we may assume that such a level of religious development is preceded by two stages—totemism and ancestor worship. Fortunately, proof of these stages has been found in Russian material. In the *Lay about the First Pagans and Idol Worshippers* there is proof of even earlier stages in the development of Russian paganism. The Slavs are known to have worshipped their ancestors before they began to worship Perun, their God, and before that they made sacrifices to vampires and the goddess of the riverbank.

Thus we see that among the Slavs religion developed from totemism to ancestor worship and finally to the worship of Perun as the "supreme ruler over all."

Modern archeology has opened up a sweeping perspective of the life of Eastern Europe in the pre-Slavonic, early Slavonic and Russian periods.

The remarkable discovery of the Tripolye culture gives us grounds for asserting that a settled, agricultural people who raised wheat, barley, rye and millet lived in the middle Dnieper and Dniester regions two or three thousand years before our era, i. e. in the pre-Scythian period. Bone mattocks, sickles

and stone grain grinders are evidence of an agricultural mode of life.

There is no need to dwell on the Scythians since Herodotus has provided us with the key to understanding their culture. Archeologists, linguists and historians have deciphered the evidence of the "father of history." The Scythians already knew the use of the plough. There are grounds for believing that the early history of the Slavs, as a people, is connected with the Scythian tribes and that, as a natural consequence, the cultural traits of the latter were passed on to the Slavs.

The relations between the Scythians and the Hellenic world are now also well known. It has been established that the Greek colony of Olvia which had long disseminated Hellenic culture among the Scythians, itself came under the influence of Scythian culture from the first century A. D., a fact which testifies to the considerable progress made by the latter culture.

Nor is there the slightest doubt that by the time the Slavs had become strong, the southwestern and southern parts of our country had established contact with the Roman state, from which they assimilated a great deal. Evidence to prove this is found in the use of dry measures and in technical methods employed in working metal, etc. among the Slavs. Archeological data permit us to speak with certainty of the existence of a considerable culture among the Eastern Slavs beginning with the sixth century A. D., a culture that displayed strikingly individual traits.

The excavations of settlements and particularly of ancient Russian cities are highly indicative in this connection. The myth that there were no cities properly speaking in pre-Rurik Russ has finally been dispelled. The excavations conducted by V. Ravidonik at old Ladoga which are still far from completed already make it possible to speak of this city as a settlement of craftsmen and tradesmen in the seventh and eighth centuries. The city consists of separate dwellings which, besides living quarters, had working premises forming an economic unit clearly indicating that each household ran its own affairs (this is the "dym" of the chronicles, the economic and taxation unit). The population lived on bread and the meat of domestic animals and fowl. Among the remains of bones found on the site, forty-six per cent are bones of swine,

twenty-eight per cent bones of cattle, fourteen per cent bones of sheep and goats and only twelve per cent bones of wild animals brought in by hunters. The picture is perfectly clear and needs no comment.

There is no need to speak of Kiev. This is a still older city, which grew up on the foundations of a thousand-year-old culture. Cities have been excavated and are still being excavated in more backward parts of Russia.

Excavations conducted by P. Tretyakov in the Upper Volga regions present concrete material for concluding that by the sixth century settlements in this part of Russia already had a class society, joint working of the land with neighbouring settlements, individual households and an unequal division of property.

Morgan's discovery of the period of military democracy in the history of the American Indians prompted a reconsideration of the question of social organisations preceding the state. In the light of his discovery we can now understand the condition of the Slavs in the so-called period of the great transmigration of peoples. The Slavs did not stream into the Roman Empire in disorderly throngs which would never have been able to withstand the Roman troops. On the contrary, they made their entrance in compact military formations, in large masses of several hundred thousand people. In the sixth century they forced the Danube River. We are even able to determine the form of organisation which they used. It was that of "hundreds and thousands," i. e. an organisation based on the decimal system found among many peoples of Europe and Asia in the pre-state period. The Kiev state received this system in a ready-made form. John of Ephesus, a Syriac historian of the sixth century, knew the Slavs as a well organised and splendidly armed people. "The Slavs," he writes, "have many weapons. These simple people who formerly did not dare to emerge from the forests and steppes and did not know what weapons were, save for two or three javelins—have now learned to wage war better than the Romans."

In this case Roman weapons fell into sturdy hands. Procopius speaks of the military skill and valour of the Antae as of a fact generally admitted. "Thanks to their valour, the Antae have made their enemies (the Goths—B. G.) be at a hasty retreat." "The Slavs," he adds, "can fight better than any other people in

mountainous and rough terrain." Maurice, a sixth century specialist on military art, also noted that the Slav youths "wield their weapons very skilfully." Byzantine soldiers were convinced that the Slavs were invincible on their own territory. They saw their only hope of salvation in the constant strife between the Slav military chieftains, a fact which they recommended their government to turn to its own advantage.

Thus the Slavs were an armed and organised people, governed by chieftains but still retaining certain democratic forms of social organisations. The popular assembly still functioned at this period. They were no longer a tribal organisation nor yet a state.

After the forcing of the Danube and the seizure of the Balkans the immediate problem confronting the Slavs was not further advance into new territory but retention of what they had conquered and the establishment of amicable relations with the native population. In place of the shattered Eastern Roman Empire which had heretofore ruled over the Balkans, there now appeared new states of the conquering peoples—Bulgaria, Serbia, Dalmatia, Illyria and Thessaly. "All these divisions among the Slavonic world," remarks the historian F. Uspensky, "fall in the second half of the seventh century and it may be assumed that certain causal relations connected them¹."

Though quite correct in his assumption, Uspensky applies it only to the Southern Slavs. What of the Eastern Slavs, known to the Byzantine writers and to Jordanes, the Gothic historian, as the Antae? Did they lag behind the Southern Slavs in their development? Did they stand apart from the great movement which we observe at the division between two periods in the history of humanity? Were they, in accordance with the Scandinavian theory, incapable of setting up their own state and forced to wait until fate sent them to three Varangian brothers?

Not one of these three suppositions is the correct one.

And yet no legend has taken such deep root in all historical literature as that based on the last of these three. Among the historians who maintained the truth of this legend were such eminent authorities as Bayer, Strubbe, Miller, Tunmann, Stritter, Schrözer, Lerberg, Krug,

Frähn, Karamzin, Polevoy, Ustryalov, Solov'yev, Pogodin, Kunik, Kostomarov, Shakhmatov and, to a considerable extent, Klyuchevsky. It was to little purpose that Lomonosov, Tatishchev, Ewers, Neumann, Venelin, Kachenovsky, Moroshkin, Savelev, Nadezhdin, Maximovich, Gedeonov, and Budilovich refuted this theory. The Scandinavian theory of the origin of the Russian state dominated all foreign literature.

The relatively small success achieved by the opponents of the Scandinavian theory is to be explained by the fact that the majority of them did not quarrel with the essential point but only with minor details. They all regarded the invitation offered to the foreign chieftains and the advent of the latter as the initial event in Russian history and disagreed only as to whence these founders of the Russian state came and to what people they belonged. Tatishchev and Boltin had them come from Finland, Lomonosov—from Slavonic Prussia, Ewers—from the Khazars, Gleman—from the Frisians, Fater and Budilovich—from the Black Sea Goths, Venelin, Moroshkin, Savelev, Maximovich and Gedeonov—from the Baltic and Polabian Slavs, Kostomarov—from Lithuania.

Kachenovsky and D. Ilovaisky approached the problem from a different angle.

Ilovaisky regarded as something utterly improbable the theory that a people, and in this particular case not a single people, but several peoples of different tribes, should have agreed to invite foreigners to rule over them, i. e., voluntarily place themselves under a foreign yoke.¹ Uspensky and Vasilevsky shared Ilovaisky's doubts. The problem was, as we see, posed clearly and correctly.

From the foregoing it would seem to follow that the old point of view concerning the origin of the Russian state should be rejected as unscientific. Science, however, takes nothing on faith.

It is necessary to return to the problem of the Eastern Slavs, known in ancient sources as the Antae and Russ.

We know that the Antae (Slavs who lived for the most part in the Carpathian and Dnieper regions)—spread as far as the Don. Archeological data confirm the fact that the Antae are the very same people who later

¹ F. Uspensky. *The History of the Byzantine Empire*. Vol. I. 1913, p. 767.

¹ D. Ilovaisky. *Research into the Origins of Russ.* 1876, p. 189.

formed the Kiev state. According to the testimony of the Byzantines and of Jordanes, who spoke the same language as the Southern Slavs, the Antae believed in Perun, possessed religious customs in common with other ancient Slav tribes and used similar decorative motifs to ornament their apparel and domestic utensils.

At the same time Byzantine writers and Jordanes find it necessary to single out certain peculiarities of the Antae.

Jordanes, who was an enemy of the Slavs and the Antae, writes: "Dacia lies adjacent to it (the Danube—B. G.) like a crown encircled by high mountains. To the left of these mountains and on the lowlands extending from the upper reaches of the Vistula dwell a great people (natio populo), the Vinidi. Although their name varies according to the tribe and the place (the time referred to is the sixth century when, as we have already stated, there were great changes among the Slavs—B. G.) they are commonly called Sklavini and Antae. The Sklavini inhabit the territory from the city of Noviodunsk and the so-called Lake Mursiisky to the Dniester in the south and as far as the Vistula in the north. The Antae, the strongest (fortissimi) among them, inhabit the Black Sea region from the Dniester to the Dnieper (Ponticum mare curvatur a Donastro extendantur usque ad Donaprum)."

Procopius also speaks of the countless Antae peoples.

By the sixth century the Antae already constituted a formidable force with whom the Greeks had to contend. Procopius speaks of their military valour and Menander of the fact they were conscious of their own strength. Jordanes mentions Bozha, a celebrated military chieftain of the Antae, whose memory lived on in Kiev Russ. Many names of outstanding people among the Antae are to be found among the Byzantines. Dobrogast, an Antaean, was in the service of the Byzantines and commanded the Byzantine fleet during the war against the Persians in 554—555. Mezamir and Kelagast, two brothers from the old Antaean tribe of Idarizia are also known in history. We also know of a noted Antaean chieftain named Ardagast whose name was given to a whole region, of Piragast, Andragast, a Czech prince named Musoki and others. All of them were prominent figures among the Antaeans

and we can warrantedly call them by the Russian title of "prince" (knyaz).

All this, together with their social system and the general level of Antaean culture in the sixth and seventh centuries impels us to reject the idea that the Antaeans lagged behind other Slav peoples. F. Uspensky correctly notes that Byzantium hampered the political unification of the Slavs who were its near neighbours. "For this reason," writes Uspensky, "the earliest attempts to unify several tribes under a single ruler occurred far beyond the limit of Byzantine influence, i. e. among the Slavs dwelling outside Byzantium." Russ was remote from Byzantine influence and could develop more freely than the Slavs settled on Byzantine territory in the Balkans. It is difficult to imagine that the most numerous and most powerful group of Slavs would not take advantage of their opportunities. There is proof to show that in their social development the Antaeans followed a course similar to the development of other medieval peoples and established a state of their own under conditions analogous to those in which other peoples of medieval Europe formed their states.

Inasmuch as the Orient, which possessed a highly developed civilisation at that time, was especially interested in Eastern Europe, it is natural that the earliest facts about Russia should be preserved in the Orient.

Masudi, who lived in the first half of the tenth century but obtained his information from older sources, writes in his work *Meadow of Gold* that at one time (he does not give dates) "one of the oldest Slav tribes—the Volhynians—ruled over the other Slav tribes. At the head of this union stood a tsar. The union later broke up and each of the resulting groups chose its own ruler." Masudi's mention of this fact is not the only one found in historical documents. By some means or other a version found its way into *The Russian Primary Chronicle of Nestor* whose author gives a few additional facts. First of all, his mention of this event makes it possible to date the break-up of this union to the reign of the Byzantine emperor Heraclius (610—641). Secondly, he linked it with the invasion of the Avars (an established fact). The Avars dealt a strong blow to the Volhynian, or, as it was otherwise called, the Duleb union. (In *The Russian Primary Chronicle of Nestor* the names Volhynians and Dulebs are used

for one and the same people). In dealing this blow the Avars themselves perished. "Not a single Avar remained," says the chronicle. "And there is a saying to this day in Russ—to perish like the Avars, to leave neither kith nor kin behind."

Many years ago V. Klyuchevsky drew attention to the coincidence of these two references, Arabian and Russian, and to their content. His conclusion was lucid and convincing. "Thus in the sixth century," he writes, "we find a strong military alliance among the Eastern Slavs in the Carpathians under the leadership of the Prince of the Dulebs... This military alliance is a fact with which we can begin the history of our country... it was formed in the sixth century in a region at the very edge of the country in the southwestern corner of our plain, on the northeastern slopes and foothills of the Carpathians."¹ It must be admitted that Klyuchevsky himself made little use of his conclusion, but this does not detract from its extreme significance. It is particularly important today when archeology has made outstanding discoveries confirming it.

From Arabian writers of the ninth and tenth centuries (Jaihani, Istahri Haukal Balhi) we learn the continuation of the political history of Russia which began in the Carpathians. These writers speak in definite and clear terms of the existence of three Eastern Slavonic political units in eastern Europe—Kuyavia, Slavia and Arsania (or Artania). Kuyavia carried on trade with foreign countries and admitted foreign merchants into its domains. It was "nearer to Bulgar," which of course must be construed as referring to the Danube Bulgars. The second political unit, located "farther away than the first," bore the name of "Slavia". The third, which was closest to Khazaria and did not permit foreigners to enter its territory, was "militant and strong since it was able to exact tribute from the border regions of Ruhm (Byzantium—B. G.)." It was called "Arsania" or "Artania". Each of these political organisations had its own "tsar" or prince.

There can be no doubt at all that "Kuyavia" is Kiev and "Slavia" the Novgorod domains, usually called the land of the "Slovenes". Opinions differ, however, about the

third of these units. Some scholars (Khvolson, for instance) place "Arsania" or "Artania" in the far north and identify it with Biarme. Others (V. Parkhomenko and A. Sobolevsky) place it in the Azov regions. Another hypothesis has been advanced by A. Udal'tsov who claims that Arsania was the old land of the Volhynians. He backs up this theory by the following fact: the Arsanians were a tribe, dwelling in the region of the Carpathians, the term "Russ" or "Ross" could easily have come from that root, as could the name of the city Arsa, residence of the tribe's tsar as mentioned by the Arabs. I must admit that there are many convincing arguments in favour of this latter hypothesis.

In the present connection, however, it is important that we stress the existence of three formations of a state type which link our remote past with the date of *The Russian Primary Chronicle of Nestor*. The *Chronicle* written by order of the Rurik dynasty pursued the direct purpose of depicting this royal house as the saviour and deliverer of Russia. There is nothing astonishing in the fact that the author of the history centred his attention and laid stress on this phase of his subject. However, the story as told in the *Chronicle* contains no evidence that contradicts the existence of an Eastern Slavonic state in the pre-Rurik period. On the contrary it even demands a filling in of the gap deliberately left by the author. The *Chronicle* begins with an entry for the year 859 about the existence of two independent centres which were later united under Oleg, who took over Kiev. The *Book of Chronicles*—one of the most remarkable attempts of the sixteenth century to summarise the history of Russia so depicted in annals, chronicles and the lives of the saints—is well aware that "even before the advent of Rurik in the land of the Slavs, the Slavs made war on many countries on Selunsk and Kherson and many other cities."

Here the *Book of Chronicles* refers to the life of Dmitri Selunsky and the archbishop Stefan Surozhsky.

The brilliant research studies into the lives of Stefan Surozhsky and Georgi Amatridsky by V. Vasilevsky opened up a new page in the history of pre-Rurik Russian history and even gave us the actual names of the princes of that early period. Vasilevsky's researches bring us to the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth century and offer a cor-

¹ V. Klyuchevsky. *A Course in Russian history*, 1937. Vol. 1, p. 104.

rect explanation as to why Russian historians had up to that time failed to pay due attention to important source materials on this period. After the authority of Karamzin as a historian brought general acceptance of the theory that the Russian state began with the invitation to the Varangians in 862, and after the monument to the thousandth anniversary of the establishment of the Russian state had been erected in Novgorod in 1862 there were few who ventured to cast doubt on this officially accepted theory and to publish source materials which would undermine it. Meanwhile the zeal of the supporters of the Scandinavian theory did not abate. Thus the ground was prepared for a protracted conservation of a theory which retarded the development of historical knowledge.

There are no grounds whatever for doubting the authenticity of Rurik. It is, however, impossible to accord him the role which the Scandinavianists attribute to him. It is not at all improbable that a Varangian band with Rurik at its head (perhaps the same one mentioned in Frankish sources) was asked to come to the aid of one of the warring sides in Slavia when the struggle became acute there, just as Vladimir "the Saint" and Yaroslav "the Wise" appealed to the Varangians for aid. Rurik was able to take advantage of the situation and seize power, i. e., to accomplish what the Varangians invited by Vladimir had been unable to do. One of the chronicle entries actually says that Rurik usurped the power, that a long and tenacious struggle was waged against him and that, despite all opposition, he remained in power. Why? Certainly not because he knew how to handle weapons and had an army to back him. It was rather because he understood the task confronting the Russian people, because he entered into Russian life, came under the domination of Russian culture and lost his Varangian traits.

Rurik's henchmen and his descendants all assimilated Slav traits at an amazingly swift pace. There is no doubt that they spoke the Russian language, prayed to the Russian gods and merged with the Russian military forces so completely that all their military terminology soon became wholly Slavonic (копье, щит, секира, лук, стрела, броня, шлем, дружина, воин, войско, воевода).¹

¹ (spear, shield, hatchet, bow, arrow, cuirass, helmet, troop, warrior, army, voevode).

The political programme which Russ put into effect under the new dynasty was one prompted by the whole course of Russian life, both before and after the Rurik period. There is no reason to suspect the soundness of the aims of this programme. It consisted of two main tasks: 1) the unification of separate groups among the Eastern Slavs and 2) the defence of the state against hostile neighbours and the establishment of economic, political and cultural relations with those states. It must be borne in mind here that it was not only to the interest of Russ but to the interest of the countries with which it had contact that such relations be established.

If we analyse the political problems confronting Russ at that time we can state them as follows:

1) The problem of the Drevlyans which involved the establishment of a western frontier and evoked sharp conflicts in view of Poland's attempts to invade Russian territory.

2) The problem of the Khazars—which involved the return of Russian lands seized by the Khazars and the safeguarding of the southern regions from the Khazars.

3) The Byzantine problem—a very complicated problem inasmuch as Russ here had to deal with an old established state against which the Slavs had been struggling since about the fifth century. It was a state which had suffered extensively from the Slavonic invasion of the Balkans and Asia Minor and which finally changed face and began appealing to Russ for military aid. Russia, in turn, needed the products which it could best obtain from Byzantium. The superior civilisation of Byzantium and its many cultural achievements were also matters to which Russ was not indifferent.

4) The problem of the Danube and the Black Sea Coast.

All the important wars waged by the Kiev state had the solution of these problems as their main purpose. It took several generations of ruling princes to solve them completely. The fact that they remained urgent for so many generations speaks of their significance and of the stability of the political policy.

After these precise and exact observations it is strange to hear opinions expressed about the primitiveness of the Kiev state, about the pillaging campaigns of the Kiev princes, about the absence of frontiers and many other things

dictated by a failure to understand the nature of this state.

The true purposes of the campaigns waged against Byzantium by Russ are brought out in the treaties with the Greeks usually concluded after the cessation of hostilities between Russ and Byzantium. Here we find no evidence to show that in 860 Russ launched a campaign against Constantinople for the purpose of annexing territory. They indicate that Russ justly attacked Constantinople to avenge the murder of Russian people (apparently envoys). Russ had every reason to demand punishment equal to the crime committed and resorted to arms without waiting to receive satisfaction. This was not plunder or pillage. It was the natural reaction of a state aware of its own strength, to an insult inflicted by a foreign state.

Thus we must admit that the high level of culture of the Kiev state and the prominent place it occupied in international relations should be considered as the result of a long course of development of the Russian people before the ninth century. The states of the Eastern Slavs were known during the centuries immediately preceding the ninth. In the ninth century these units merged into the single Kiev state.

The Kiev state was one of the largest pre-feudal states, similar to the empire of Charle-

magne, the states of Tigranes the Great, of Genghis Khan, etc. The distinguishing characteristic of these pre-feudal states was that the state power, already separated from the common people, was still able to utilise the masses as soldiers and as payers of tribute without any intermediate link such as large feudal lords. This power, unifying the people, strengthening the frontiers of conquered territories and extending them, was sufficient to fulfil the large tasks confronting the state.

As feudal social relations developed within the pre-feudal state and the feudal nobility strengthened its position (a process which was undoubtedly facilitated by the state power itself through its connections with the growing feudal class). This nobility began to represent a new force which contributed to the weakening of state power and, in the final analysis, to the disintegration of the state.

Such was the course of development followed by the Kiev state as well.

The new process of unifying the whole Russian people belongs to another period and is connected with other conditions. But the foundation of this structure was laid in the Kiev and pre-Kiev periods.

Such is the problem of the formation of the Russian state viewed in the light of new, principally archeological, research.

“THE YOUNG GUARD”

By *Alexander Fadeyev* — excerpts from the novel

ALEXANDER FADEYEV'S new novel *The Young Guard* is now being published in serial form in the *Znamya*, a literary monthly. Actual events that occurred in 1942 provided the author with the material for this novel.

Soon after the Red Army liberated the Donbass from the Germans, articles began to appear in the Soviet press about the *Young Guard*, an organization of young people which was active in Krasnodon, a small town in the Donbass. Five members of the *Young Guard* — Oleg Koshevoy, Sergei Tyulenin, Ivan Zemnukhov, Uliana Gromova and Lyubov Shevtsova — were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The *Young Guard* consisted of about one hundred young boys and girls from sixteen to eighteen years of age. These erstwhile pupils of Soviet schools inflicted substantial losses on Hitler's forces during the tense critical months when the German army was storming Stalingrad. They circulated leaflets, blew up German cars, set fire to buildings housing Germans and destroyed grain ready for shipment to Germany. When they finally fell into the hands of the Gestapo and were subjected to unbelievable mistreatment and torture, the members of the *Young Guard* never wavered, retaining their indomitable spirit to the end. They went to their death as victors, unbroken, convinced that their country would triumph and their enemies perish. It is of their unsurpassed courage and exploits that Alexander Fadeyev writes in his novel.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the task facing the author in writing this novel was complicated by the highly dramatic and stirring quality of the events which he describes. Without violating the truth of the facts he is dealing with, the author had to weave them into the plot of a work of fiction.

Fadeyev introduces the reader to the leading figures of this underground organisation a short time before the events which make up the main part of the story. His purpose in doing this is to analyse, consider and lay bare the sources which gave rise to the fearless exploits performed by the members of the *Young Guard*.

Deliberately and gradually Fadeyev unfolds his novel, not so much in the chronological as in the psychological sense. As he introduces new characters into the story he gives biographical facts, but concentrates most of his attention on the moral aspect of their personalities. Although he is writing of characters who are practically all of the same age, cultural

level and political convictions, his portraits are extremely varied. There is Oleg Koshevoy, the leader of the *Young Guards* — an intelligent boy, a born organiser who has perfect command over himself and looks at life calmly and clearly. Another is Serezha Tyulenin — energetic, enterprising, hot-headed, always dreaming of great deeds and famous explorers and scientists. Then there is Vanya Zemnukhov who lives in a sphere of purely intellectual interests and who regards problems of science and art as things that concern him personally and directly. Or Valya Borts who proudly defends her pure girlish dreams. Side by side with these main characters are many other boys and girls who form the background of this portrait of a whole generation.

Certain definitive traits are common to all those characters, unlike as they are. A feeling of human dignity is highly characteristic of all these boys and girls. From their very childhood they felt that they were to be the masters and the builders of their country. They prepared themselves for a life of free, creative labour and it was precisely this training for constructive work that enabled them to cope with the problems of war. Shut off from the atmosphere to which they were accustomed all their lives, separated by miles of front line from the Soviet government and Soviet public life, these Krasnodon boys and girls were themselves the embodiment of Soviet principles and took up the fight against the German invaders. No matter how great the burden of the duty they undertook to perform, it did not make them seem any less the boys and girls that they were. The world of youth is present in the novel with all its determination to win, with its diversity of interests, its intolerance of evil and its wholesome strong feelings.

Retaining all the ordinary traits of youthful behaviour and all the interests characteristic of their age, these boys and girls are amazingly quick to react to social and ethical problems. As Fadeyev says: “a feeling of reality prompted their actions.” All the characters in the novel are equally illuminated by the glow of a splendid and chaste romantic spirit. The merging of the real and the romantic is extremely characteristic of all of Fadeyev's books and in this case it is required by the very nature of the exploits performed by the Krasnodon *Young Guard*, exploits which cleanse and inspire our souls despite the fact that all the leading characters in the novel perish.

We herewith give two excerpts from the novel.



Alexander Fadeyev

CHAPTER XII

WHAT WOULD you do, reader, if you had the heart of a lion, bursting with courage and daring, thirsting for heroic exploits, yet you were still a youngster, running around barefooted, the skin on your feet rough and chapped, and in everything, absolutely in everything that made your soul leap, you were completely misunderstood by the human race?

Serezhka¹ Tyulenin was the baby of his family and he grew like the grass on the plains. His father, born and bred in Tula, left his home-town in search of a job when still a boy, and made his way to the Donets Basin where in the course of forty years spent in the pits as a miner he acquired those qual-

ties of naïvete, self-esteem and despotic pride characteristic of his trade—features distinctive of no other people to such an extent as of sailors and miners. Even after he ceased work altogether, he, Gabriel Petrovich Tyulenin, still considered himself to be lord and master in his house. Morning he aroused everybody in the place because as an old miner it was second nature for him to be up and about when it was still dark—and because he was bored when alone. And even if he had not been bored, he would have awakened everybody just the same with his coughing. He coughed from the moment he opened his eyes, coughed for no less than a solid hour, gasping for breath, hawking and spitting his head off, and all the time there was a rattling in his throat and a whistling and a wheezing in his chest like an old organ gone bad.

After that he sat around the rest of the day leaning his shoulder on his leather-padded Y-shaped crutch—a raw-boned gaunt man with an elongated hooked nose, once large and fleshy but now so sharp that it could have been used as a paper-cutter to slit the leaves of a book, with sunken cheeks covered by a stiff gray stubble, with faded yet piercing eyes under thick bushy eyebrows, with enormous straight fierce moustaches which, retaining all their pristine magnificence beneath his nostrils, gradually tapered out to the extremely springy thinness of single hairs sticking out on either side like spears. And he sat there on his cot, or shifted to the threshold of his hut, or moved on outside to a chock hard by the shed, bent over his crutch, bossing everybody around, telling everybody off, sharply, menacingly, by fits and starts, coughing and gasping for breath so desperately that the rattling and whistling and wheezing could be heard throughout the length and breadth of Shanghai.¹

When a man loses over half his capacity to work while still not very old, and then completely sinks into such a state as this—let him try and raise, teach a profession to, and send out into the world a brood of eleven: three lads and eight lasses!

And it would hardly have lain within Gabriel Tyulenin's power to do so, had it not been for Alexandra, his wife, a strong woman of Orel peasant stock—whose females the folk

¹ From the name Sergei: Serezhka is the diminutive familiar form, with a touch of affection.—Trans.

¹ Part of the town of Krasnodon, called Shanghai by the inhabitants because the first of a number of little huts was built by a Chinese.—Trans.

of old Russ dubbed *boi-baba*, brabbling fire-eating viragoes. A real *Berthe aux grands pieds* type, she was still vigorous beyond every shadow of doubt and had never known a day's illness. It's true she also didn't know how to read and write, but she could as occasion demanded be grimly stubborn or sly, she could wag her tongue or hold it still, she could be malevolent or kind, cajoling or pert or biting, and if anybody out of sheer ignorance provoked her to a quarrel, that person very quickly learned he had taken the wrong sow by the ear.

And so ten of the offspring were out making their way in the world, while Serezhka, the youngest, although he attended school, grew like the grass on the prairie. He didn't know what it meant to be shod and clothed in his own right—everything he had on was a hand-down, cut and recut ten times over; he had been tempered by all manner of suns and winds and rains and frosts: the skin on his feet was thick and padded like a camel's; and no matter what injuries and wounds he suffered, they all healed over in a twinkling as though he were some veritable *bogatyr*, some fabulous Russian knight of old.

His father, who rattled and whistled and wheezed at him more than at any of his other progeny, also loved him more than any of the others.

"What a rascal, eh?" he would say, withal in a satisfied tone, stroking those fierce moustaches of his. "Ain't that so, Shurka?"—Shurka being what he called his sixty-year-old partner and friend of a lifetime, his wife Alexandra. "Take a look at 'im, eh? Ain't afeard of any scrap goin'. Just like me when I was a nipper, eh?" Cough-cough-cough-ugh-ugh... And he was off again, hacking and wheezing away so hard as to leave himself in a state of stupefaction.

You have the heart of a lion, yet you are still a youngster, you are badly dressed, and the skin on your feet is rough and chapped. What would you do, reader? Of course, first of all you would perform some great exploit? But who doesn't dream of great exploits in childhood?—yet somehow they don't always come off.

If you are a schoolboy in the fourth grade, and during the arithmetic lesson you fetch some sparrows out of your desk and turn them loose, that may not bring you glory. The principal—for the umpteenth time!—sum-

mons your parents, that is, Mama Shurka, aged sixty. Grandpa Gabriel (following the happy-go-lucky example of their mother all his children called him Grandpa) is raging mad, and rattles and wheezes away, and is just itching to cuff you over the head, but he can't get at you, and only bangs away with his crutch, which he can't even let fly at you because it has to support his wizened body. But Mama Shurka, after she comes back from school, gets busy on you with a vengeance and gives your ears such an honest-to-goodness boxing that your cheeks flame and your ears ring for days on end after that—the passing years only seem to add strength to Mama Shurka's arms.

And your comrades? Huh—some comrades! No wonder people speak about "the bubble reputation." The very next day your exploit with the sparrows is forgotten.

In your free time during the summer you can achieve a degree of tan blacker than anybody else's, you can learn to dive and swim better than anybody else, and you are more dexterous at catching young pickerel with your bare hands under the thick branches of trees fallen into the river. You can engineer a feat like this too: upon spying a flock of girls hopping and skipping along the bank, you can take a swift running start on shore and with a mighty lunge shove off from the steep bank in a graceful swallow dive, your brown body cutting the water like a knife, and you plunge deep down, and at the moment when the girls are pretending complete indifference but are watching with growing curiosity to see when you'll rise to the surface, under the water you slip off your shorts and suddenly come floating with a plop to the surface, your backside sticking up, your ruddy glowing backside being the only part of your body which has not been touched by the sun!..

You experience a momentary sense of keen satisfaction when you see the twinkling pink heels and wildly fluttering dresses of the girls who literally tear head over heels from that bank in a mad scramble to get away. You carelessly accept the acclamations of delight expressed by the rest of the fellows who are lolling about on the sand taking a sun bath. You have for all time won the undying admiration of the urchins, who hereafter will dog your footsteps in droves, imitate you in every way, and implicitly obey your every word,

the mere crook of your finger. The times of the Roman Caesars have long since passed, yet the little boys idolize you.

But of course that's not enough for you. And so one fine day, seemingly no different from any other day of your life, you suddenly jump out of the second-storey window at school right square into the yard where all the youngsters are busy as usual innocently playing their games during the recess period. In the space of time that it takes you to travel through the air—a single short instant that passes like a flash—you tingle with a sheer piercing delight that knows no bounds. It surges through you with the novel sensation of flight: it is heightened by the wild fearful shriek emitted by all the girls—every last one of them, from the first to the tenth grade—the shrieks also prompted by an avid desire to attract the attention of the whole world to themselves on any and every occasion.

What follows would be better veiled—nothing but bleak disillusionment, nothing but sackcloth and ashes.

The conversation with the principal is a very trying one. The point in question is obviously your expulsion from school. You are forced to be churlish with the principal because you are in the wrong. For the first time the principal himself decides to pay a visit to Shanghai to see your parents.

"I want to see for myself under what conditions this boy lives. I want to find out what in the world is the cause of all this," he says, as importantly and politely as a foreigner. And in his voice there is a note of reproach levelled at your parents.

And your parents—your mother, with her soft round hands which she doesn't know how to hide because she has only just been dragging the big cast-iron pots out of the stove and her hands are black with soot, and she isn't even wearing an apron to wipe her hands on. And your father, absolutely flabbergasted, leaning heavily on his crutch tries to struggle to his feet in the presence of the principal—your folks look at the principal as though they really are to blame for everything.

When the principal leaves, at first nobody swears at you, as though not a soul wants to have a thing to do with you. Grandpa sits there without looking at you, only hacking away once in a while, and his moustaches are not so fierce after all, but pretty droopy, like

the moustaches of a man who's been knocked about a plenty in his lifetime. And your mother bustles through the house, scrapping her feet along the earthen floor, fussing a bit here, a bit there, and all of a sudden you see her bending over the Russian stove and stealthily brushing away the tears with that soot-blackened, old, round, beautiful hand of hers. And with their whole beings your old mother and father seem to be saying to you:

"Yes, you, take a good look at us, you, look at us good and proper, see who we are, what we are!"

And for the first time you realize that it's been mighty long since your old folks have had a decent thing to wear when holidays come around. And almost all their lives they haven't eaten together with the kids at the same table—they've eaten separately where they couldn't be seen, because they don't give themselves anything but potatoes and black bread and buckwheat porridge, just so's the kids, every last one of them, could be put on their feet—so that now you, the youngest in the family, could have an education, could grow up and get to be somebody.

And your mother's tears scald your heart. And you see your father's face in a new light for the first time: he looks important, yet at the same time pathetic. And the fact that he rattles and wheezes is not at all funny—it's tragic.

Through quivering nostrils your sisters breathe wrath and scornful contempt when first one then another suddenly darts a glance at you over her knitting. And you are churlish with your parents, and churlish with your sisters, but at night you can't fall asleep, you feel deep resentment, and at the same time you are conscious of a gnawing sense of guilt. And noiselessly with your unwashed palm you wipe away two meagre tears rolling down your hard bony cheeks.

And after that night you seem to have grown up.

In the midst of a series of cheerless days marked by general silence and censure, a whole world of fabulous exploits suddenly opens up before your enraptured gaze.

Men travel twenty thousand leagues under the sea and discover new lands; they get washed up on the shores of distant uninhabited isles and build their lives anew with their own hands; they scale the highest peaks in the world; they even explore the valleys of

the moon; they battle the fiercest storms at sea, clamber up the masts swaying in the wind and crawl out onto the top and into the crow's-nest; they steer their vessels over sharp reefs, emptying barrels of blubber over the raging waves; they cross the ocean on rafts, suffering excruciatingly from thirst, their parched swollen tongues rolling leaden bullets around in their mouths; they weather sandstorms in the desert, fight off boa constrictors, jaguars, crocodiles, lions and elephants, and lay them low. Men perform these exploits for profit, or to make their lives worth living, or because of their passion for adventure, or out of comradeship, true friendship, or to save a beloved maiden in distress, or else simply for the good of mankind, for the glory of their native land, so that the light of knowledge will forever shine on earth—Livingstone, Amundsen, Sedov, Nevelskoi.

And what exploits people perform on battle-fields! Men have been warring for thousands of years, and thousands of people have fought the enemy heroically and covered themselves with eternal glory. It's just your luck—you had to be born at a time when there were no wars! You were born in a place where the grass grows gray over the common graves of men who laid down their lives that you might walk the earth happily, and up to the present day the fame of the captains of those great years rings out with undiminished vigour. Something virile and inspired, like a song sung on the march, swells in your breast, as, forgetting the late hour of night, you pursue the course of their lives through the pages of their biographies. You want to come back and pore over those lines again and again, to engrave the images of those men in your heart, and you draw their portraits—no! why say something that isn't so: with the aid of a piece of glass you copy their portraits on paper, and then you shade them in to the very best of your ability with a soft black pencil, moistening the point in order to get a darker and more positive picture, so that by the time you finish your tongue is all black and you can't even clean it with pumice stone. And those portraits hang on the wall over your bed to this very day.

The deeds and exploits of those men made the life of your generation secure and they remain fixed in the memory of man forever. And yet they were just such simple 'folk as you are. Michael Frunze, Klim Voroshilov,

Sergo Orjonikidze, Sergei Kirov... Sergei Tyulenin... Yes, may be even your name, the name of an ordinary YCL'er, would take its place side by side with theirs, if you could only manage to show the stuff you're made of. And as a matter of fact, how fascinating and extraordinary the lives of these men actually were! They knew all the ins and outs of secret revolutionary work as carried on during tsarist times. They were hunted down, thrown into prison, exiled to the North and to Siberia. But they escaped again and again, each time plunging back into the conflict. Sergo Orjonikidze escaped from exile. Michael Frunze escaped from exile twice. Stalin escaped from exile six times. At first they led only a few people, then hundreds, then hundreds of thousands, and then millions.

Sergei Tyulenin was born at a time when there was no need to carry on secret revolutionary work. He had no place to escape from, and no place to escape to. He jumped out of a second-storey window at school, and that had been simply foolish, as he now saw clearly once and for all. And he led only one individual: Vitka¹ Lukyanchenko.

But that did not necessarily mean you had to lose hope. The great ice sheets chaining the immense expanses of the Arctic Ocean crushed the hull of the Chelyuskin. And the cracking of that ship at night was a terrible thing—it was heard by a whole nation. But those on board did not perish: they landed on the ice. The whole world followed the train of events—would they be saved, or not? And they were saved! There are lion-hearted courageous people in this world. They are simple folk, just such as you. On their aircraft they fight their way through blizzards and cold to those in distress and bring the rescued back tied to the wings of their planes—they are the first Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Chkalov! He was just such a simple person as you are, but his praises ring out like a challenge in every corner of the world. The flight across the North Pole to America—a dream which had long fired the imagination of mankind! Chkalov. Gromov. And the Panarin quartette on the ice?

So life throbs on, full of dreams and of prosaic workaday doings.

Throughout the wide Soviet land, and in Krasnodon itself, there are people, simple people like you, excited for their exploits, sur-

¹ From Victor. See footnote on p. 40—Trans.

rounded by a blaze of glory—such people were formerly not even mentioned in books. Every person in the Donets Basin, and not only in the Donets Basin, knows the names of Nikita Izotov, Alexei Stakhanov. Every young Pioneer can tell you who Pasha Angelina is, and Peter Krivonos, and Makar Mazai. And everybody accords them merited honour. And Grandpa always asks you to read him the places in the paper where it tells about these people, and then for some reason or other he sits there rattling and wheezing away, until at last it dawns on you, and then you can see with half an eye what a bitter pill it is for him to swallow—to realize he's old, and what the mine car that hit him... Yes, life certainly saddled him with some weight for one pair of shoulders to stagger under—him, Gabriel Tyulenin, Grandpa. — And Serezhka understood then how hard it was for Grandpa to resign himself to the fact that he could no longer take his place side by side with these people.

The glory of these folk was genuine glory. But Serezhka was still little, he had to study. All this would come to him some time in the future, there, yonder, in adulthood... Yet lo and behold! he was fully prepared to perform exploits like those of Chkalov and Gromov here and now—deep down in his heart he felt that he was fully prepared. But the trouble was that in all the world not another person could be found who understood this—not a single one. Of the entire human race he was alone in this conviction. And sometimes he even caught people shooting sidelong glances at him in a way which said as plain as the nose on your face: that frisky lad won't be picking my pocket next, will he?

That was what Serezhka was like when the war broke out. He made one attempt after another to enter a special military school—he simply had to become a flyer. But he was not accepted.

All the school kids turned out to work on the fields, but he, cut to the heart, went down the shaft. In a fortnight he was at the stope, hewing coal shoulder to shoulder with the men.

He himself did not realize how great was the respect he had won in the eyes of those around him. He came out of the cage at the pit-head as black as he could be, with only the whites of his eyes showing, and his small even white teeth glistening in that coal-black face. He walked together with the men,

swaying just as solidly as they, and took his shower, snorting and hawking like his father, after which he unhurriedly made his way home—barefooted now: his boots were not his own—they belonged to the mine.

He returned home late, when everybody had eaten—he was fed separately. He was already a grown person, a man, a worker. His mother took the iron pot of borshch out of the stove and poured him a bowlful straight from the cavernous vessel which she held in both her round hands with a cloth. The steam curled heavily up from the soup, and the home-made wheat bread had never seemed to taste so good as it did now. Grandpa looked at his son, his faded yet piercing eyes flashing from under his bushy brows. He did not wheeze and cough, he talked quietly to his son, as to an equal fellow worker. Every detail interested the old man: how things were going in the mine, how much each man hewed. He asked about the tools, and about the workclothes. He spoke about seams and levels and drifts and crosscuts and stopes and winzes, like you would about the rooms and corners and closets in your own apartment. As a matter of fact the old man had worked every mine in the district, and when he could no longer get around, he kept abreast of what was doing through his comrades. He knew in what direction the coal was being worked and how the output fared, and, by tracing lines in the air, with his long bony fingers he could explain to any ready listener the position of the workings underground and everything that was going on down there, below the surface.

The following winter found Serezhka racing off straight from school to some friend or other without even stopping off at home for a bite. He was on his way to see a gunner, or a sapper, or a mine-layer, or a flyer, and towards midnight he would be home sitting up, his eyes sticky with sleep, doing his lessons. And at five o'clock in the morning he would be at the shooting range, where his latest sergeant-friend would teach the lad, together with his man, the fine points of handling the rifle and light machine gun. And in point of fact he came to be as good a shot as any of the regular recruits with the rifle and the light machine gun, the revolver and the mauser, the T-T automatic revolver and the Degtyarev *handly auto*, the Maxim gun and the PPS tommy gun. Nor was he a

whit less skilful in throwing the hand grenade and the fire bottle bombs; and he could dig himself in and plant a mine—or lay a whole minefield and demine a locality, with the best of them. And on top of all this he knew the make of every single aircraft put out by all the countries in the world; and there wasn't an unexploded airbomb going that he couldn't dispose of. — Vitka Lukyanchenko learned all this together with him, for Serezhka dragged his friend along everywhere, and Vitka looked up to him in approximately the same way that Serezhka looked up to Sergo Orjonikidze or Sergei Kirov.

That spring he made one more attempt, a most desperate attempt, to get into a flying school—it was a place not for lads of his age, but a school for adults. And again he was turned down. They told him he was under age, and to "come around a year from now."

Yes, that was a terrible blow—and instead of attending a school for aviators he was busy throwing up defence fortifications on the approaches to Voroshilovgrad. But he firmly made up his mind not to go back home.

What dodges and shifts did he not resort to, in order to be enlisted in a military unit at the front! He did not disclose to Nadya even one-hundredth part of the artfulness and cunning he stooped to, the humiliation he suffered before he achieved his end. And now he knew a thing or two about fighting, about mortal fear, about death.¹

*

Serezhka went to bed and slept so soundly that even the morning coughing of his father did not arouse him. He awoke when the sun was already high. The window shutters were closed, but he could always tell the time by the position of the shafts of golden light which came through the crannies between the slats, by their position on the floor and on the objects in the room. He awoke, and at once realized that the Germans had as yet not come.

He went out into the yard to wash up, and caught sight of Grandpa sitting on the step and, a little ways off from Grandpa, Vitka. Ma was already in the kitchen garden, and his sisters had long since gone off to work.

"Aha! Howdy, navvy! Well-well, what's

¹ The entire chapter up to this point is a telescoped account of Serezhka's life which the author interpolates while Serezhka is sitting on his sister Nadya's bed telling her what happened at Voroshilovgrad.—Trans.

new! Cough-cough-cough-ugh-ugh . . ." Grandpa wheezed at him in greeting. "Alive an' kickin', eh? Nowadays that's the main thing. Heh-heh! This sidekick o' yours's been around sence sun-up, waitin' fer you to stir yerself." And Grandpa very benignly pointed his moustaches in the direction of Vitka, who stood motionless, humbly and gravely keeping his velvety eyes fixed on the sleep-creased face of his mischievous friend, already bubbling over and thirsting for action.

"That's a fine mate ye've got there," Grandpa went on. "Every day, first thing in the morning before it's light, he's here johnny-on-the-spot: 'Serezhka here yet? Serezhka come back?'—Serezhka's the... cough-cough... salt o' th' earth fer 'im!" Grandpa pronounced with satisfaction.

In this way their loyal friendship gained seal and sanction through the lips of Grandpa.

They had been at Voroshilovgrad together, working on the earthwork defences there. Vitka had also been anxious to stay on, in order to join up with a military unit. But, absolutely devoted to the other as he was—heart and soul and root and branch—he had given in when Serezhka had insisted outright that he go home—not because he was sorry for Vitka, and even less for his parents, but because he was sure both of them would not be taken on together, and furthermore Vitka's very presence might minimize his, Serezhka's, chances of being enlisted. And Vitka, utterly distressed and deeply hurt by the behaviour of his despotic comrade, had been forced to go away. Not only had he been forced to go away, but he had also been obliged to swear by all that was holy to keep mum and not breathe a word about Serezhka's plans either to his own or to Serezhka's parents or, for that matter, to anyone in the world: Serezhka's pride had demanded this, in case he failed.

From what Grandpa said, it was clear that Vitka had kept his word.

Serezhka and Vitka went around behind the hut and sat down on the bank of the dirty sedge-choked brook, beyond which stretched a pasture for cattle; beyond the pasture loomed the lone big bath-house recently erected for the miners and not as yet opened. They sat at the edge of the ravine, smoked, and exchanged news.

Of all their school friends—they both attended the Voroshilov School—the only ones who had remained behind were Tolya Orlov,

Volodya Osmukhin and Lyubka Shevtsova, who, according to Vitka, was leading a peculiar sort of life not at all in her style. She didn't leave her house and go anywhere, and was not to be seen in a single public place. Lyubka had formerly attended the Voroshilov School, but she had left after completing her elementary education because she had decided to become an actress. She had thereafter taken to singing and dancing on the stage at theatres and at clubs in the district. Serezhka was particularly glad to hear that Lyubka had stayed in town: Lyubka was a dare-devil tomboy, and the kind who would stick to a friend through thick and thin. Lyuba Shevtsova was Sergei Tyulnenin in skirts.

Another thing Vitka told Serezhka—or rather whispered in his ear—was something he already knew: Ignate Fomin had an unknown guest hiding at his place, and everybody in Shanghai was breaking his head trying to figure out what sort of a fellow he was, and everybody was afraid of him. And another thing: out in the Senyaky neighbourhood where the munitions dumps were located, there was a cellar absolutely wide open, and in it a few dozen fire bottles had been left, probably lost sight of in the last-minute rush to get away.

Vitka timidly hinted that it wouldn't be such a bad idea to swipe those fire bottles and stow them away somewhere, but Serezhka suddenly remembered something, grew stern, and said that they both had to go to the military hospital right away.

CHAPTER XV

While Matvei Shulga was sitting alone in a darkened room in Ignate Fomin's hut, not knowing what manner of man his host was, nor what manner of people he was going to work among—at that very same time Serezhka Tyulnenin and his sister Nadya and his friend Vitka Lukyanchenko, and the old nurse Aunt Lusha in the course of several hours had located in different parts of town over seventy apartments whose owners were ready to put up wounded men from the hospital.

And still there remained about forty wounded for whom no place had been found and, cudgel their brains as they would, neither Serezhka, nor Nadya, nor Vitka, nor Aunt Lusha, nor any of the people who had helped

them, could think where they might turn for assistance without endangering the success of the whole undertaking.

That was an extraordinary day—such days happen only in dreams. The near and distant noises made by the military units and refugees travelling the road that lay through town, the thunder of battles on the plains—all this had ceased the day before. An unusual silence hung over the city and the surrounding countryside. The Germans were expected any minute—but they still didn't come. Office buildings and stores stood gaping and empty, but no one entered them. Factories and plants were hushed, and also empty. Over the sites of the blown-up shafts the smoke still billowed and rolled upward. No authority existed in town, there was no militia, there was no trade, there was no work being done—there was nothing. The streets were deserted—a solitary woman would dash out to the water hydrant, or to the well, or to the kitchen garden, tear off two or three cucumbers, and again all would be quiet, not a soul to be seen. Not a whisp of smoke found its way out of the chimneys on the housetops—no one was cooking dinner. And the dogs were quiet—there were no passers-by to disturb them. Only a cat would sometimes dart across the street, and again all would be deserted.

The wounded were taken out and quartered on the night of 19 July, but Serezhka and Vitka no longer lent a hand in this affair. That night they were busy carting away the fire bottles from the munitions dump near Senyaky to Shanghai, where they buried most of them in the ravine behind the bushes, keeping out a few which they buried in their own kitchen gardens so that in case of necessity there would always be some bottled fire on tap to fall back on.

But what had become of the Germans?

Dawn found Serezhka in the plains beyond the city limits. The sun rose behind a pinkish gray haze, big and round, something you could look at, almost lay your hands on. Then it thrust its eye over the edge of the haze, became a molten mass, and millions of dew drops began dancing on the plains, each with its own sparkle, while the dark *terracones*, the pit waste dumps, rising above the floor of the plains here and there, became suffused in a reddish glow. Everything all around emerged from the shadow and sprang to life in the dazzling light, and Serezhka felt the way a

rubber ball must feel when you begin playing with it and bouncing it around.

A beaten road ran along the railway line, in places approaching, in others receding from it. The road and the line had both been laid across a plateau from which small spurs projected on either side. These spurs, cut up by ravines, sloped gradually down until they were lost in the plains. The spurs, as well as the shallow folds of ravines in between, were carpeted by scrub growth and by a small leafy braky wood. This whole district was called Verkhneduvannaya Grove.

The sun, which immediately applied itself to the task of baking everything red hot, soon stood high over the plains. From where he was Serezhka could see almost the entire town, sprawled over hill and dale in irregular knots, thicker around the mines with their distinctive surface structures, and around the buildings of the District Executive Committee and the Krasnodon Coal Trust. The crowns of the trees on the spurs shone bright green in the sunlight, while the bottom of the densely overgrown ravines still lay concealed in the cool morning shade. The steel rails flashed in the sunshine and, extending into the distance, merged and disappeared beyond a far-off hill, from behind which a billowy white mist climbed slowly into the heavens—that was where the railway station of Verkhneduvannaya was situated.

And suddenly on the crest of that hill, at that point where the beaten road seemed to end, there appeared a dirty stain which spread swiftly nearer in the shape of a narrow dark ribbon. A few second later the dark ribbon detached itself from the horizon and Serezhka made out an elongated compact and sombrous mass sweeping from out of the distance toward him, leaving a cloud of reddish dust behind. And even before he could examine it and make up his mind what it was he realized from the pounding roar which filled the plains that a detachment of motorcycle troops was coming.

Serezhka ducked down quickly into the bushes below the road and waited, stretched flat on his belly. Inside a quarter of an hour the mounting roar of motors had reached a crescendo of noise which enveloped everything, and the German motorcycle tommy gunners flashed past Serezhka—there were over a score of them. From where Serezhka lay, only the upper parts of their bodies were visible. They wore the ordinary dirty-gray

uniforms of the German army and pilot's helmets, but their eyes, foreheads and the upper portions of their noses were covered by enormous dark convex goggles, which lent a fantastic aspect to these men who had suddenly appeared here on the Donets plains.

They rode on until they reached the outermost houses, where they braked their machines, dismounted, and scattered in all directions, three or four remaining behind with the motorcycles. Before ten minutes had elapsed they were back again and, one after another mounting their motorcycles, they continued on their way to the city.

Serezhka lost sight of them behind some houses in one of the hollows, but he knew that if they kept on toward the central part of town, headed for the park, they couldn't avoid a rise in the road, beyond the second railway crossing, clearly visible from where he was. He therefore settled down to watch this rise. Suddenly four or five of them shot up the incline and spread fanwise, but they did not continue on to the park. Instead they veered off toward the block of structures on the hill where the buildings of the District Executive Committee and the "bedlam baron" loomed. A few minutes later they were speeding back toward the crossing, and Serezhka again saw the motorcycle troops among the outermost houses—the detachment was on its way back to Verkhneduvannaya. Serezhka crouched low among the bushes and did not raise his head again until the entire group had swept past him.

He then rose and made his way over to one of the spurs covered with trees and bushes and projecting out in the direction of Verkhneduvannaya. From here the whole district lay before him, clearly visible. When he reached a suitable place he flung himself down under a tree and remained thus for several hours. Time and again the sun found him out and straightway set to work to bake him through and through, but each time he crawled away from the sun—into the shade again—describing a circle around the tree.

Bumble-bees hummed in the bushes, collecting the July harvest of nectar from the late summer flowers, as well as honeydew, the sticky sweet film of juice which aphids secrete on the underside of the leaves of trees and bushes. From the leaves and grass which grew luxuriantly here—elsewhere over all the plains everything was parched and burnt—a

refreshing breath was wafted now and then. Sometimes a soft breeze blew faintly and rustled through the leaves. High, high up in the sky floated small puffs of fleecy clouds, looking very bright in the sunlight.

And such a feeling of lassitude spread through his limbs and took possession of his spirit that there were moments when Serezhka forgot why he was there. Quiet, clean memories came welling up within him, memories of his childhood years, of those times when he used to lie stretched out as he was now, in the grass somewhere on the plains, eyes shut, the sun baking his body, the bumble-bees humming around him as now, the odour of hot grass over everything.—The world seemed to him at that moment so near, so limpid, so eternal. And again in his ears echoed the rapid choking roar of motors, and he saw the motorcyclists in their unnaturally enormous goggles against the background of the blue heavens above, and at that instant he understood that the quiet, clean days of his childhood, those early unique breaths of happiness, were gone, never more to return. And he felt such a bittersweet contraction around the heart that his whole being again overflowed with that unrelenting grim thirst for battle which boiled in his blood.

The sun had passed its zenith when from beyond the distant hill a long dirty arrow once more drove into sight along the road and immediately a dense cloud of dust billowed on the horizon. It was a detachment of motorcycle troops again—but this time there were many more of them, an endless column. Behind them came automobiles,—hundreds, thousands of trucks, with the passenger cars of commanders among them. The machines came rolling and rolling over the hill. It was a long thick green scaly snake, gleaming in the sun, uncoiling, stretching out longer and longer from beyond the horizon—its head was far past the place where Serezhka lay hidden, but its tail had not yet come into sight. The dust lay on the highway in a dense cloud, and the roar of motors seemed to fill the entire space between heaven and earth.

The Germans were entering Krasnodon. Serezhka was the first one to see them.

Propelling himself forward like a cat, with a movement something between a crawl and a glide and a bound, Serezhka crossed the road and the railway line, and at full tilt he

rushed down into the ravine on the far side of the eminence, from where he was no longer visible to the German column on the march beyond the railway embankment.

He had executed this manoeuvre for one very good reason: he wanted to reach town before the Germans and occupy the most advantageous position in the city itself—the roof of the Gorky School, situated in the city park—as an observation post.

He dashed through the vacant field surrounding an abandoned worked-out mine, and came out on the far side of the park into an alley behind what was popularly known as Derevyannaya or Wooden Street—that selfsame street which since days of yore seemed to have kept to itself, out of the main stream of urban life.

And it was here a scene caught his eye which was so unexpected and startling as to make him pause, in spite of himself. Then without a sound he crept stealthily along the fences which separated him from the private gardens and orchards that gave upon the rear of Derevyannaya Street, and in one of the little orchards he now clearly saw that selfsame girl he had chanced to meet the night before in the truck as it had sped across the plains.

The girl lay on a plaid blanket spread on the grass under the acacias, her head on a cushion punched up into a ball. There she reclined, about five paces away, her profile toward him, one bronzed leg crossed over another, and, regardless of what was going on all around, she was reading a book. One of her thick golden braids was carelessly flung over her cushion, accentuating the tan of her face with its dark eyelashes, and her full proud upper lip was slightly raised. Yes, at a time when thousands of vehicles were filling the entire expanse between heaven and earth with the deafening roar of motors and the noisome smell of burning fuel—a whole German army—and entering Krasnodon, the girl lay stretched out on a plaid blanket in a garden reading a book, holding it in her sunburnt down-covered hands.

Serezhka stood there hardly daring to breathe, a whistling sound escaping his lungs, as he gripped the planks of the fence before him, and for a short blinding space he was both dazzled and ecstatically happy as he gazed at her. There was something at once as naive and as beautiful as life itself in this girl

reclining with the open book in a garden on this, one of the most horrible days in the history of the world.

With a courage born of despair Serezhka vaulted over the fence, and there he was, standing at the feet of the girl. She put aside her book, and her eyes—beneath their dark lashes—came to rest on Serezhka with an expression of tranquility, of astonishment, of joy.

The night before last, after Maria Andreevna Borts¹ had brought the school boys and girls from Belovodsk District back to Krasnodon, the whole Borts family—her mother and father, Valya² herself, and her younger twelve-year-old sister Lucy—had not slept a wink till dawn.

They had sat by the light of a kerosene-lamp—the power station which had supplied the city with current for lighting had ceased operations on 17—they had sat around the table one opposite the other as though they were at someone else's house paying a visit. The news they had exchanged was not involved, but it was so terrible, that they found themselves unable to talk about it out loud in the stillness which reigned over the house, the street, the entire city.

It was already too late to run away. But the prospect of remaining filled them with horror. They all—even Lucy, a youngster with golden hair like her sister's, but even fairer, and with large grave eyes in a pale little face—they all felt that something so monstrously irreparable had overtaken them, that neither the mind nor the heart could as yet grasp the magnitude of the misfortune.

Her father was in a pitiable state. He kept smoking without letup, rolling and lighting one cigarette after another. It was already hard for the children to recall the time when their father had seemed to be the incarnation of strength, the mainstay and defence of the family. He sat there, a meagre skinny little man. His eyesight had always been poor, but latterly it had almost failed, and it was with difficulty that he prepared his lectures. Like his wife, he taught literature, and she often looked over his pupils' papers and notebooks for him. He made out nothing by the light of the lamp, and his eyes, of a sort of Egyptian cast, stared straight ahead without blinking.

Everything all around was in its usual place, everything looked familiar as it had always looked, as it had been since childhood, and yet everything was changed. The dining table covered with a coloured cloth, the piano on which Valya had practised her pieces every day, the sideboard with its glass doors in which the simple tastefully chosen dishes were arranged symmetrically, the open shelves full of books—everything was as it had always been, and yet everything was different. Valya's numerous admirers had always agreed that the Borts' home was cosy and romantic, and Valya knew that it was she, the girl living in that home, who had made everything about her romantic. And yet everything stood there before her as though naked.

They were all afraid to put out the light, to part company, to go to bed and remain there in solitude each with his own thoughts and feelings. And so they sat speechless till morning—the clock alone breaking the silence with its ticking. Only when they heard the neighbours fetching water from the hydrant situated diagonally opposite their house, did they blow out the light and throw open the shutters, while Valya, purposely making as much noise as she could, undressed and went to bed. Lucy went to bed too. But Maria Borts and her husband continued to stay up.

Valya awoke with a start. Her mother and father were in the dining room, from which came the clink of chinaware—her mother in spite of everything had decided to serve tea. The sun shone in through the window. And a sudden wave of disgust came over Valya as she remembered the night they had just sat out together. How humiliating and terrible to so demean yourself! After all was said and done, what did she care about the Germans? She had her own inner spiritual life. Let those who liked that sort of thing drive themselves frantic with uncertainty and terror, but as for herself, she had no taste for that sort of thing, no, none.

She had the time of her life washing her hair in warm water, and after that she drank tea to her heart's content. Then she took down a volume of Stevenson containing *Kidnapped* and *Catrina*, spread a plaid blanket in the garden under the acacias, and lost herself completely in the book.

Around her all was quiet. The sunlight streamed down on the neglected flower-bed and on the lawn. Brown butterflies alighted

¹ The girl's mother. — Trans.

² The girl in the garden. — Trans.

on the blossoms, and spread and fluttered their tiny wings by turns. Lack-lustre shaggy bees with broad downy white bands around their little paunches went poking from one flower to another, humming sweetly. The old many-boled, many-branched acacia tree cast a protective shadow all around. Through the leaves, which were turning yellow in spots, could be seen patches of the aquamarine sky.

And this marvelous world of sky and sun and grass and bees and butterflies was magically bound up with another, a fictitious world, a world of books—a world of adventure presided over by an extravagant Mother Nature, in which human courage and nobility, pure friendship and pure love, were supreme.

From time to time Valya put aside her book and fell into a deep reverie as she gazed at the sky through the acacia branches. Where did her fancy roam? She herself did not know. But my God! how wonderful it was to stretch out alone like this in such a marvelous garden with a book!

"Everybody's probably managed to get away", she mused, remembering her school mates. "And Oleg's probably gone too." She and Oleg Koshevoi were friends, as were their parents. "Yes, everybody's probably forgotten all about her, about Valya. Oleg's gone. And no sign of Stepka. What a friend! 'I swear!' he says. Bah, the big-mouthed braggart! Now, that fellow who jumped into the truck—what's his name... Sergei Tyulenin... Serezhka Tyulenin—I bet if he swore, he'd be sure to keep his word..."

And in her imagination she was Catriona, while her hero, kidnapped but full of courage and nobility, looked very much like that Serezhka who had vaulted into the truck last night on the plains. She felt sure his hair was hard and wiry, and she simply ached with the desire to touch it.

"There can't be much to a fellow, if his hair's soft like a girl's, a real fellow has to have hard wiry hair... Oh, if only they'd never come, those Germans!" she thought, as a feeling of inexpressible yearning surged through her. And again she plunged into the fictitious world of the book and the garden bathed in sunlight with its shaggy humming bees and fluttering brown butterflies.

In this way she spent the whole day, and on the following morning she again took her plaid blanket and her cushion and her volume of Stevenson and went out into the garden.

That's how she would live now, in the garden under the acacias, no matter what happened in the world outside...

Unfortunately, such an order of life was unthinkable to her parents. And her mother could hold out no longer. She was a noisy, healthy, active creature, with full lips, large teeth and a loud voice. No, that sort of life was impossible. She made herself tidy before the mirror and sallied forth, bound for the Koshevoi house to find out if they had remained in town or not.

The Koshevois lived on Sadovaya or Garden Street, the house standing at the main entrance to the park. They occupied half of this house which the Krasnodon Coal Trust had placed at the disposal of Oleg's uncle, Nicholas Korostylev, or Uncle Kolya. In the other half lived Saplin, the principal of the Gorky School, where Maria Borts taught.

The solitary crash of an axe echoed down Sadovaya Street, and to Maria Borts it seemed that the sound issued from the Koshevoi yard. Her heart beat faster, and before she went through the gate she looked around to make sure she was unobserved, as though she were committing a dangerous and unlawful act.

A dishevelled-looking black dog lying on the porch, panting, his red tongue hanging out because of the heat, sprang up at the sound of her heels, but on recognizing her he blinked with a guilty expression, as if to say:

"Scuse us, but the heat, ye know—I ain't even got enough pep to wag me tail to ye",—and he flopped down again on the floor.

Grandmother Vera, gaunt, tall and sinewy, was chopping wood, lifting the axe high with her long bony hands and bringing it down with such force that a loud "Hah!"—a sound between a grunt and a diabolical laugh—escaped her lips at each whack. Obviously, she did not complain of lumbago, or it may be she acted on the principle of "kill or cure"—"one nail drives out another!"

Grandma's face was deeply tanned, dark, and peaked, her nose was thin, with quivering nostrils—in profile Grandma always put Maria in mind of a picture of Dante which she recalled seeing in a pre-Revolutionary edition of *The Divine Comedy*. The crisp ringlets of her graying dark chestnut hair framed her swarthy face and fell to her shoulders. Usually she wore spectacles with fine black tortoise-shell rims, which she had owned so long that one of the bows passing

over the ears had broken off out of sheer weight of years, and was now attached to the rim by a bit of black thread. But at the present moment Grandma was without her glasses.

She was working with particular, almost vicious energy—with a redoubled, quadrupled intensity that made the chips and chunks of firewood clatter and fly wildly in all directions. The expression on her face, the line of her whole body, reflected her thoughts in no uncertain terms—

"Blast those Germans! Blast you all, an' you're afeared o' the Germans! I'd ruther chop this yere wood... Hah!-hah!.. An' these yere chunks o' wood—blast 'em too! Yes, I'd ruther make a noise and raise the roof with these yere chunks o' wood than let meself sink as low as you are. An' if I'm afated to die for that, then blast me too! I'm old! I ain't afeard o' dyin'!.. Hah!-hah!.. "

And Grandma Vera drove her axe so furiously into a gnarled chump of wood that it stuck there: whereupon she swung axe and log over her shoulder and brought them down axe first on the chopping block with such terrific vigour that the chump split in two and the pieces went hurtling madly, one of them almost bowling Maria over like a ninepin.

Only then did Grandma Vera become aware of her presence. She squinted, recognized her and, tossing aside the axe, called out in a strong voice which seemed to echo and re-echo up and down the whole length of the street.

"Aha! Maria!.. Maria Andreevna. Now that's fine ye've come. I'm right glad to see ye set enough store in us to stop by. Thet gal o' mine, Lena, she's shoved her head into a piller, an' her been bawlin' fit to kill these last three days straight, she has, weepin' her eyes out like a fish. An' I sez to her: 'Lena,' I sez 'where d'ye get all those tears from?' But she... Come in. Please come right straight in!..."

The sound of her loud voice frightened Maria and at the same time instilled new hope in her breast—after all, she herself liked to speak out without any qualms. Just the same, when she spoke up, her voice was low, an apprehensive note in it:

"And have the Saplins gone?"

"He's gone, all right. But the rest o' the family's sittin' tight, no fear—an' bawlin' away fer all they're worth too... Maybe ye'll

set down and have a bite with me? I've cooked me that fine a beetroot borshch, but they's nobody wants to eat."

Yes, Grandma Vera was all there, without the faintest shadow of doubt. You'd never catch her eating humble pie, not she—good old Granny!.. The daughter of a village carpenter, Grandma Vera haled from Poltava Gubernia. Her husband, born in Kiev, had been a foreman at the St. Petersburg Putilov Works. He'd taken part in World War I, and when he'd received his discharge after being severely wounded, he had settled down to live in her village. After she had married, Grandma Vera had not submerged her own personality in that of her husband's, but had struck out along her own path. She had been a village delegate, had worked on the Committee of the Poor Peasants, and had then found employment at a hospital. The death of her husband had not crushed her: on the contrary it had stimulated her independent spirit. Now, it is true, she was not a wage-earner and lived on her pension; yet she could still raise her strong voice in case she felt called upon. Grandma Vera was a member of the Communist Party with twelve years' standing.

Her daughter Helen, Oleg's mother, was lying on her bed face down, her colourful dress all crumpled, her feet bare, her fair heavy plaits, which usually crowned her head in a complicated coiffure, at present streamed down her back almost to her heels clinging to the shapely curves of her vigorously youthful, lovely figure.

When Grandma Vera and Maria entered the chamber, Helen Koshevoi raised her tear-stained face with its prominent cheeks, now wet, her wise, kindly eyes swollen. No sooner did she catch sight of the newcomer than she gave vent to a squeal of delight, and flung herself at Maria, seizing her in a tight embrace. They held each other thus, pressed close together, and kissed and cried and then laughed. They were overjoyed that at such a moment they had each other to embrace, to find sympathy from, and to share each other's common grief. They wept and laughed by turns, while Grandma Vera, thick-veined arms akimbo, shook her curly Dante's head from side to side and repeated over and over:

"Look at 'em—sech silly fools! First they cry and then they laugh. 'Pears to me there's nothin' to laugh at, an' as fer cryin', there's plenty o' time ahead fer that!..."

And at that moment a strange noise reached the women's ears, a mounting noise—was it the roar of many motors?—accompanied by a fiendish swelling howl, as though all the dogs in town had gone stark and staring mad.

Helen and Maria released each other. Grandma Vera dropped her arms, and her darkly-tanned face visibly blanched. They stood thus for several seconds, not daring to think what those sounds signified, yet already grasping what those sounds actually did signify. And on the spur of the moment all three of them—first Grandma, then Maria, then Helen—rushed out into the little front garden, and without exchanging a word, understanding instinctively what not to do, they ran out not to the wicket gate but through the rows of sunflowers to the jasmine bushes planted along the fence.

The roar of many machines, mounting in volume, came from the lower end of the city. The wheels of machines were already rumbling over the hump at the second crossing, but nothing was as yet visible from here. And abruptly at the end of the street, on a slight rise, appeared a gray passenger car, its top down and its windshield blindingly reflecting the rays of the sun as it came around a curve: it drove slowly along toward where the women stood among the jasmine bushes. In the machine, stiff, stern, motionless, sat several military men in gray, with gray military caps, the front of the crowns standing high above the visors.

Behind that machine came several more passenger cars. They hurtled over the crossing into the street and one after another swung around in the same direction toward the park.

Helen, keeping her eyes unblinkingly fixed on the approaching machines, with frantic movements of her small slightly thick-jointed fingers suddenly began gathering up first one then another of her plaits and winding them around her head. She went through the motions very rapidly, absolutely mechanically, and then, realizing she had no hair-pins with her, she continued to stand there holding her twisted braids to her head with both hands as she stared down the street.

Maria, with a suppressed ejaculation, plunged away from the jasmine bush behind which she had been standing, and rushed not in the direction of the gate giving upon the street, but back toward the house. She raced around the building, skirting that half in which the Saplins lived, and dashed through the second gate leading from the Saplins out into the next street parallel to the one along which the Germans were riding. This street was empty, and down it she sped home.

"Forgive me, but I haven't got the strength to break the news gently to you, . . ." she gasped out to her husband. "Courage . . . You've got to hide right away . . . They might come pouring down our street any minute now."

She could hardly catch her breath, and held her hand to her heart, but like all healthy people her exertions had made her so red and she was perspiring so freely that these external manifestations of her emotions absolutely belied the horrible significance of what she said.

"Germans?" Lucy said softly, with such an unchildlike accent of terror in her voice that Maria suddenly stopped dead. She looked at her daughter and then, bewildered, glanced around.

"Where's Valya?" she asked.

Her husband stood there with pale lips, mute.

"I'll tell you, I saw everything", Lucy said, her tone unnaturally quiet and grave. "She was reading in the garden, and some fellow, a big one, jumped over the fence. She was lying there. Then she sat up. And they talked and talked. And then all of a sudden she got up and they climbed over the fence and ran away."

"Where to?" Maria asked, her eyes arrested and still.

"To the park . . . She left the blanket and the cushion and the book. I thought she'd be coming right back; so I went out and watched the things to keep anybody from stealing them. But she didn't come back, and I brought everything inside."

"My God! . . ." Maria exclaimed, and sank heavily to the floor.

FROM THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN CULTURE

REMINISCENCES OF VALENTIN SEROV

By His Daughter *Olga Serova*

FATHER had no real studio, but worked in his study. It contained an unpainted table of his own design, an easel, a couch, a piano on which I used to practise, several chairs and a small cupboard with two drawers where he kept his paints, pencils, palettes and scrapers.

There were scrapers of all sizes, shapes and kinds. Father very often scraped off what he had painted, ruthlessly removing the paint from a canvas that was almost finished.

His palettes and brushes were always kept absolutely clean. The table in his study held his books, magazines, paper, water colours, charcoal, a small hand mirror which he often used for checking up his painting, a penknife and leather cases for pencils and charcoal. The few things he had were of the best quality.

There was practically nothing in the room to indicate that it was used by an artist. There were no hangings or draperies flung about, no bear skins, no artificial flowers for still-lifes, no pictures on the walls.

Only in the dining room there hung a pastel winter landscape which he had painted and a water colour by Benois called *Finland*. There was a small but lovely mirror in the living room where Somov's *Spring in Versailles* hung.

Father was very fond of knick-knacks. We still have a mahogany book case, also built to his own design, with his favourite toys arrayed on the top shelf just as they used to be in his lifetime.

Among them are tiny figurines of Russian courtiers and ladies from Troitsko-Sergeievsky Abbey, a marvelous snake made of a reed, a papier-mâché tiger with fierce eyes and a head that nods, a tiny gondola from Venice, wee little hats, figures of fish and birds, castanets, large brightly coloured beads brought from Greece where they were used to decorate mules.



Valentin Serov—Portrait by Repin

Father was very fond of children, liked to play with them, amuse them, play jokes on them and tease them. Children were equally



Green Pond—1888

fond of him but were a little afraid of his teasing.

He was very simple and candid with both children and adults. As a man of perfect taste, he never allowed any trace of vulgarity or affectation to creep into his relations with children. He never used pet names like "kitten", "sunshine" or others of the same sort.

With all his kindness and responsiveness sometimes his fear of being sentimental or showing his feelings, as well as his tremendous sense of humour often led to extremes, when his jokes hurt and his frankness was taken for severity.

After father's death Benois wrote: "None of us took other people's troubles so to heart as Serov did. None of us loved so deeply and loyally as he did. It is not for me to describe his family life but I can say that he was the ideal husband and father."

Benois was right. I cannot recall a single quarrel that ever took place between my father and my mother, not a single angry word passing between them. There were of course little vexations, injured feelings and disappointments, but they were quite of a different kind and there was nothing vulgar or spiteful in them, nothing that in any way resembled what is usually called "family scenes."

People who did not know father well would have been very astonished to see how gay and cheerful he could be.

Father often used to visit Korovin's estate. There Chaliapin, Korovin and father—all good friends—would spend their days fishing, absolutely carefree and enjoying themselves to the full. In the evenings the estate manager, a staid and sober gentleman, used to step in. He always bowed and then hung his hat on a nail, always on the same one. One night father pulled out the nail and simply painted it on



Peter I—1907

the wall. When the manager came in, he greeted everyone as usual and started to hang his hat on the customary nail. The hat, of course, fell down. He picked it up and quietly hung it up again only to see it fall on the floor for the second time. The astonished manager made a third attempt and again the hat fell. This time he was frightened. He paled and made the sign of the cross, to the delight of the three friends.

Father was very busy in Moscow. He taught in the art school, was a member of the Board of Directors of the Tretyakov Art Gallery, painted portraits, worked at home on historical subjects and on illustrating tables. Any leisure time was spent in reading. He read a great many books on history, a subject in which he was immensely interested. He was a constant attendant of Klyuchevsky's lectures on Russian history. He was fond of memoirs. He liked music and understood it.

He had a superb ear for music. Both his father, Alexander Serov, and his mother, Valentina Serova, were composers, and he had grown up in a musical environment. He was an inveterate attendant of concerts and theatres. Mozart was his favourite composer.

His mother, Valentina Semyonovna Serova, was an unusual woman. A pupil of Anton Rubinstein, she was a brilliant pianist and composer. She wrote four operas — *Uriel Acosta*, *Maria d'Orval*, *Ilya Muromets* and *Vstrepenulis*. The stage settings for the synagogue scene in *Uriel Acosta* were designed by V. Polenov. The opera was performed with success at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow and also in Kiev. *Ilya Muromets* was produced at the Mamontov Theatre in Moscow with Chaliapin in the title role.

Valentina Serova devoted thirty years of her life to the cultural development of the Russian village.



Portrait of Princess Orlov—1910

In 1892 she travelled to Simbirsk Province to help the famine-stricken peasants and remained there to devote herself to musical work among the peasants.

A woman of tremendous energy, unshakeable will, strong temperament and outstanding organisational ability; she formed a peasant troupe which she directed in scenes from Russian operas.

The peasants were utterly devoted to my grandmother. They loved her and esteemed her and used to tell her that when she died they would put up a monument to her.

The police always kept a watchful eye on her activities, and in 1904 she was banished from Simbirsk Gubernia.

Desirous of having a last look at Sudosevo (the village in Simbirsk Province where she had lived and worked for years) she returned there in 1917, not long before her death. Although she had just suffered a second stroke which paralyzed her arm, she was full

of the joy of anticipating a return to her beloved village.

"This will round out the circle of my life," she said.

The founding of a library in Sudosevo was her last public service.

"Progress in musical education among the broad masses of the people," wrote the newspaper *Pravda* after her death in 1924, "will be forever linked with the name of Valentina Serova who gave many years of her life to promoting musical education in the Russian village."

Father liked to visit Domotkanovo, the estate of Vladimir Derviz, who had been his classmate at the Academy. It differed from other large estates in Tver Province in that it was constantly visited by talented people there. Located in the centre of the Province it was easily accessible, and soon became a Mecca for visitors, a sort of "state within a state," which gave the Governor of Tver Province cause for complaint.

During the summer Vladimir Derviz placed the school at our disposal as a summer home. It was near this school that the portrait of my mother known as *Summer* was painted. This picture is now in the Tretyakov Gallery. My brother and I are also in this picture, though so faintly that we seem little more than patches of colour. I remember how we stood twirling some flowers that we had picked, not sure just what we were supposed to do. We did not have to "pose" for very long, however. Father soon let us go and we hurried back to our interrupted game.

Father painted a great many pictures in Domotkanovo. One of them was the portrait of his cousin Maria Simonovich known as *Girl in Sunlight*, painted when he was only twenty-three years old.

It took him three months to do this portrait. His cousin was an artist herself, sculptor, and made a willing and patient model. Father painted very calmly and unhurriedly.

The artist Ulyanov mentions this picture in his reminiscences of my father. "Its appearance in the Tretyakov Gallery," he wrote, "will go far to establish the reputation of this outstanding new artist. For originality of technique and enchanting spontaneity it is hard to find its equal either in current exhibitions or in the Gallery itself. From now on the signature of Serov on a picture will impel us to look closer into each new portrait and each new sketch."

Father considered this portrait one of the best he ever painted.

In 1895 he did another portrait of his cousin, then Mme. Lvova. This picture, also painted in Domotkanovo, is full of the joy of a summer day.¹ It was shown in Russia in 1914 at the posthumous exhibition my father's works and was afterwards returned to Mme. Lvova in Paris.

Just before the beginning of World War II, Mme. Lvova decided to present this portrait to the Tretyakov Gallery, but the outbreak of the war and the occupation of Paris by the Germans prevented her from carrying out her intention.

Father's portrait of Pushkin in the Lycée park was also planned in Domotkanovo. It was painted at the order of Peter Konchalovsky, father of the contemporary painter, for a new edition of Pushkin's works.

There was an old iron bench in the park at Domotkanovo that served for the bench in the picture. Vladimir Derviz posed for the figure of Pushkin.

In none of the existing pictures of Pushkin do I so feel the "poet" in him or the full beauty of his genius as in this picture by my father.

Hollerbach wrote as follows of this picture: "It is an unsurpassed masterpiece. Despite its sketchiness, it is a genuine portrait and from the point of view of drawing, is one of Serov's most skilful works. The portrait is profoundly lyrical in its mood, a work of art equal to Pushkin's *Reminiscences* and elegiac verse."

While in Domotkanovo father worked a great deal on illustrations for Krylov's fables. He made countless sketches for each fable. When another artist would have sketched from memory father made a careful study of the actual setting of each fable. For instance, when making the drawings for *The Wolf and the Crane*, he visited the environs of Domotkanovo which were the haunt of wolves. For the fable *The Peasant and the Robber* he spent much time searching for a thin, hornless cow, drawing this and other characters figuring in the fable from life.

When he started work on *The Crow and the Fox* he placed a ladder against a huge fir tree at the edge of the park, climbed up to

one of the highest branches and made his sketches from there.

He found material for many of the other fables in the environs of Domotkanovo. He often said that he pictured the action of many of the fables as taking place precisely in the country around Domotkanovo.

When father was working on a portrait he spared neither himself nor his sitter. He became completely engrossed in his work. At first glance you might not notice the intensity with which he worked because of the ease and harmony of his movements. With a brush or a piece of charcoal in hand, he would approach the easel, look at the model, then at



Portrait of Fedor Chaliapin—1905

¹ There is a reproduction of this portrait in I. Grabar's monograph on Serov. Several French artists considered it superior to *Girl in Sunlight*.

the canvas or the paper, make a few strokes, step back again and sometimes look at what he had done in a mirror. His movements were precise and very quick. There were no deep wrinkles on his brow nor any signs of strain, no tightly pressed or drooping lips. His face was calm and concentrated. But his eyes were so alert and looked out with such concentrated intensity, with such utter desire to see and absorb everything he needed, that his glance seemed like lightning. Like lightning it seemed instantly to illuminate every object within its scope to the minutest detail.

Nikolai Ulyanov relates that father was once painting a model together with the pupils in a life class at the art school. The model failed to put in an appearance at the last lesson. Father was very much disappointed and upset as he wanted to finish painting the arm. One of the pupils suggested that he finish it without the model.

"You probably can," father said, "but I cannot."

He used to become very tired from working on portraits. He painted a great many,

although not nearly so many as he was asked to do. It was a very difficult and even painful task to request him to do one's own portrait or the portrait of a close relative or friend. Often he refused, but his refusal was perhaps no more difficult to accept than his consent, in view of the fear all had of his all-seeing eye.

When the Literature and Art Society ordered father to paint portraits of Lensky and Yuzhin, both of these actors were very much afraid that he would caricature them, as they were both inclined to portliness.

Girshman implored father to paint out the hand in his portrait as it looked as though he were reaching into his pocket for money. Father refused with the remark, "Either as it is or not at all." When finished, the portrait was hung in a back room at the Girshman's.

Only a few people know how much time, attention and effort father gave to studying historical documents, ambassadors' reports and collecting all possible information about the appearance of the person whom he was painting, his character, his habits, mannerisms, mode of life, environment, clothes, and tastes.


Father was deeply interested in Peter I and devoted much time to pictures of him.

His albums contain many items about Peter, his appearance, his character and habits. There are many drawings, sketches of Peter's death mask and of his wax figure, sketches of costumes, hats, shoes (in colours) and even a very exact life-size drawing of the sole of one of his boots.

In his monograph on Serov, Igor Grabar writes that these sketches have outgrown their initial purpose and are to be considered as profoundly significant pictures illustrating Russian history. In Grabar's opinion Serov created a portrait of Peter in these sketches which surpasses any we have and constitutes one of the greatest achievements of Russian art.

Father's albums also contain several sketches for a statue of Peter. They indicate the striding figure of the tsar on a tall column.

In Paris, in 1910 father modelled a figure of Peter. I did not see it, but artists who did said that it was an amazing piece of work in its forcefulness of expression and mastery of execution.



Girl in Sunlight—1888

In 1907 Diaghilev brought the Russian ballet to Paris. His productions of Russian ballets, performed by the finest dancers of that time, were truly remarkable. The stage designers and artists collaborating in these productions included Benois, Bakst, Serov and Golovin. The performances in Paris soon won the Russian ballet worldwide fame.

The year he died father painted a curtain for Diaghilev's production of Rimsky-Korsakov's *Scheherazade*. In St. Petersburg he showed the design for the curtain to Diaghilev, Benois, Bakst, and others. No one expected to see the sort of design he showed them: "The design does not strive after effect," father wrote in a letter to mother, "but it is forceful and noble in conception. Alongside of the other vivid decorations and curtains it will make a pleasant impression. I do not know who will do the actual painting and how. I am thinking that perhaps Efimov and I should try doing it in Paris."

When father arrived in Paris from Rome in May 1911 he decided not to wait for the money and materials, such as canvas, brushes and paints which Diaghilev had promised, but bought everything himself and set to work on the curtain with Efimov. In a month they had finished the job. The first act of the ballet was performed with this curtain as backdrop.

"The most brilliant example of this sober realist's gift for fantasy and fairytale," wrote one of the critics of that time, "is certainly his decorative curtain for Bakst and Fokine's ballet *Scheherazade*. It is a huge canvas stretching across the entire stage of the theatre and embodying in monumental proportions all the intimate and lovely poesy of Persian miniatures."

This curtain was used by Diaghilev in London when his ballet troupe performed for King George V. It aroused tremendous admiration and was also shown during the American tour of the Russian ballet. The curtain was the personal property of my father. After his death the further fate and whereabouts of this curtain remained unknown.

In the spring of 1910 I was in Paris with father for a short time on my way to Normandy where my younger brother Anton was undergoing treatment for tuberculosis.

In Paris father seemed like a new person, he was so cheerful and seemed so satisfied with life. The expression on his face was



Portrait of Girshman—1911

different and even his gait. Coming out of the house in the morning he would buy a rose and carry it in his hand or sometimes between his teeth. He did not like to walk and preferred driving in a carriage no matter how slowly it moved. In his opinion one should not expend energy in walking when the destination is a museum.

When I arrived in Paris father took me to the Louvre. As we ascended the staircase and passed the *Victory* by Botticelli on the wall. He turned to me and said, "You may pray."

After walking through several of the rooms with me and stopping in front of the things which he considered worthy of special attention, he left me and went to make drawings of some Persian miniatures.

In the evenings he liked to draw from life at the studios of Colorossi and Julien.

Lev Lvovich Tolstoy (the writer's son) once met him at Julien's studio and has described this meeting as follows:

"Serov came in with the sculptor Strelletsky. He sat down in a corner and started sketching. It was very interesting to observe with what

inspiration and skill Valentin Alexandrovich made the model come to life on the pages of his album in large firm strokes. He looked at her for a long time before he started drawing and then sketched in a few well placed lines...

"During a moment's recess I asked him to show me his sketches and my impression was that there was probably no draughtsman in all of Russia who was Serov's equal.

His sketches were not a whit inferior to Rodin's in their forcefulness and were superior in truthfulness and delicacy of detail."

An international exhibition was held in Rome in the summer of 1911. A whole room was devoted to father's works and his success was enormous.

"If anyone is to be crowned on the Capitoline for this exhibition, it will certainly be Serov," wrote A. Benois at the time.

Father was a man of free and independent views. In 1908 A. Golubkina, already a well known sculptor, was refused permission to study drawing in the art school on account of her political offences in the past. The head of the school, who was also Governor-General of Moscow, pronounced her application, endorsed by my father, as "unworthy of attention."

"Anna Golubkina is one of the few real sculptors in Russia," father wrote, "and her request deserves careful consideration."

He was very much angered by the refusal and despite all the persuasion and pleas of his pupils, of his fellow teachers and of Prince Lvov, he resigned from the school.

He received a telegram signed by 140 of his pupils to which he sent the following reply: "I definitely have resigned from the school. The only consolation I can offer you is that I shall not teach in any government school or academy again."

This telegram brought the following answer, dated February 11, 1909: "To our dear teacher Valentin Alexandrovich. Although we are sorry to our irreplaceable teacher with whom our dearest impulses and hopes are linked, we hail you as an artist who sets the freedom of art above all else. We are deeply grateful for all that your stay in our school has given us and firmly hope that we shall again meet you as a teacher in a free school and not in this government institution. Signed: General assembly of the students of the School of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture."

The incident ended with the following acknowledgment from my father: "My thanks

to the assembly for their kind feelings toward me. I shall treasure your telegram as the most precious reward for my efforts. Serov."

During a performance of the opera *Boris Godunov* in St. Petersburg in 1910 Chaliapin kneeled before the box in which Tzar Nicholas II was sitting. Chaliapin subsequently explained this action as simply an impulsive gesture prompted by his mood at the moment and denied that he intended it as a mark of homage.

The very fact that Chaliapin had kneeled to the Tzar, however shocked my father and upset him. I recall how he paced the room, walked over to the window and stood there for a minute, shrugging his shoulders in perplexity and then began to pace again. There was an expression of suffering on his face and he kept rubbing his chest. "How could Fedor Chaliapin," he said, "a man of left views, a friend of Gorky and Leonid Andreyev, possibly have done a thing like that?" Father wrote Chaliapin a letter and they never met after that.

In 1911 Chaliapin and father were both in Paris at the same time. Chaliapin later described his meeting with father at a theatre. He desperately wanted to approach him, to regain father's friendship but he did not know how to go about it, how to begin, what father's attitude toward him would be. Tormented by doubts, he could not bring himself to approach father. Fearing to meet him in the crowd, Chaliapin went up the gallery and sat there during the rest of the performance.

In 1905 father witnessed the shooting of the workers' demonstration in St. Petersburg. He happened to be in the Academy of Arts and from the window saw the crowd approaching with ikons and portraits. He saw how a volley was fired at the crowd, how the wounded and killed fell to the ground, how blood flowed on the street.

When he returned to Moscow he looked like a person who had just gone through a serious illness.

The president of the Academy of Arts at that time was Grand Duke Vladimir, uncle of Nicholas II. He also was in command of the troops of the Petersburg area and it was he who had given the order to shoot at the demonstration.

Serov and Polenov wrote a letter and sent it to Count Ivan Tolstoy, Vice President of the Academy, with a request that it be read at a meeting of the Academy.



Tsar Peter II and Princess Elizaveta Leave for the Hunt—1900—1901

The letter was an open challenge to the Academy and to Grand Duke Vladimir and in the final run to the Tsar himself.

Count Tolstoy did not, however, bring the letter before a meeting of the Academy and as a protest against this action father resigned from membership in the Academy of Arts.

The letter read as follows:

"Your Excellency, Count Ivan Ivanovich, we hereby present a petition which we request be read at a meeting of the Academy!"

To the Meeting of the Imperial Academy of Arts!

The terrible events of 9 January have brought pain to our hearts. Several of us saw how soldiers killed defenceless people on the

streets of St. Petersburg. The picture of this bloody terror is deeply imprinted upon our memories.

We artists are deeply grieved that the person in command of these soldiers who shed their brothers' blood is also at the head of the Academy of Arts whose mission it is to disseminate humane ideas and lofty principles.

Vasilii Polenov
Valentin Serov"

Later, when Diaghilev proposed that father paint another portrait of Nicholas II, father replied with a telegram which ran as follows: "I no longer do any work for that family."

In 1905 father did a series of cartoons and drawings on revolutionary themes as well as cartoons of Nicholas II. Several of them were published at the time in magazines but others were ruled out by the censors.

Even when he was travelling through Greece and revelling in the beauty of the Parthenon, antique marbles, and the ruins of ancient civilisation, his thoughts were with his beloved country.

When he learned of the dissolution of the Duma he wrote mother a letter from the Isle of Corfu in which he said that he was again oppressed by the Russian nightmare, that he was ready to give up in despair as the future held nothing but darkness.

During the last year of his life father often suffered fits of depression.

I recall the evening just before father died. He was sitting in the dining room on a small couch, ready to go calling. Some friends were to come for me and take me to the cinema. Father sat in silence for awhile and then suddenly said, "Living is a dull business but I am afraid to die." Just then the doorbell rang. Father got up and asked for his coat and stick from the front hall. We wanted to leave through the back door so as to avoid meeting anyone.

The next morning the nurse took Natasha, my three-year-old sister, into his bedroom as usual. Father liked to play with her in bed in the morning. She turned somersaults on the bed, climbed over him and had a jolly time.

It was time to get up, however. He had to work on the portrait of Princess Shcherbatova, so he called the nurse to take Natasha.

Father got up and as he bent down to tie his shoelaces, he gave a sharp cry and fell back on the bed. The nurse heard his cry and

ran upstairs to call me. "Come quickly, quickly," she cried. I ran down as fast as I could and rushed into father's room.

Father was lying on the bed, stretched out on his back, his eyes open, with an expression of fright in them. He showed no signs of breathing. Mother was trying to revive him with spirits of ammonia and I began to rub his feet, but it seemed to me that I could feel them growing cold in my hands.

My brother was sent to call Dr. Troyanovsky, a friend of the family. When he arrived, he sat down on the bed and put his stethoscope to father's heart. "It's all over," he said, and, bowed with grief, went up to my mother.

It was a beautiful sunny day, unusually bright. Through the window we could see the Arkhivny Park with its Lombardy poplars all white with hoarfrost. At the corner of the street stood the usual droshky. Grown-ups and children were walking past the house, busy with their own thoughts and affairs. I looked out of the window and could not believe that what had happened was actually true.

The news of father's death quickly spread all over Moscow. Friends began arriving. I remember Nikolai Dasekin. He stood in father's bedroom in utter silence, his eyes never leaving my father's face, his own wearing an expression of love and tenderness. He stood very quietly, the tears running down his face.

The bell kept ringing all night as telegrams from one friend after another were delivered to the house.

It is interesting to note that two of father's contemporaries, one of them his intimate friend, the artist and critic Alexander Benois, the other a mere acquaintance—the well known poet Bryusov, the former in St. Petersburg and the latter in Moscow, should have expressed exactly the same thoughts about father after his death.

Both of them drew attention to the fact that while father did not like vivid colours he created an impression of a great variety of colours with his modulated tones.

"Serov, profoundly truthful Serov who was an artist to the marrow of his bones," wrote Benois, "knew that there was only one true art and that it was always truthful by the very clairvoyance of its character, that it was always 'real'.

"Who can say what is more wonderful, what is more artistic, what is truer to life—



Winter—1898

Paradise as depicted by Fra Angelico, the fascinating beauty of Botticelli and Correggio, the horrible grotesque of Goya, the mysticism of Rembrandt or the charm of simple truth irradiated and illuminated by prosaic reality in the works of Titian, Velasquez, Hals and Serov.

“And so there is nothing ‘dreadful’ about putting his name alongside of these ‘dread names’.”

Bryusov wrote in his article: “Serov was a realist in the best sense of this word. He divined the truth of life and his paintings brought out the essence of things which other eyes were unable to discern. This is why Serov’s portraits are so full of meaning. They always create the impression that the artist is passing judgement on his contemporaries, judgement

all the more stern in that that there is no appeal from it.

“The collection of Serov’s portraits will preserve the whole desolate truth about the people of our time.”

“Serov entered the realm of painting as his own kingdom, where the right to rule was his by birth. He penetrated its very heart, the same road ornamented by the triumphal arches of Titian and Velasquez, Tintoretto and Rubens.

“The somewhat lugubrious, reticent and concentrated Serov resembled the later Titian. If Serov had been fated to paint a portrait of Charles V, Titian would certainly have bent down to hand the artist the brush he had dropped.”

VOKS CHRONICLE

SERGE PROKOFIEFF AWARDED GOLD MEDAL OF ROYAL PHILHARMONIC SOCIETY

THE COMPOSER Serge Prokofieff was presented with the Gold Medal of the Royal Philharmonic Society at a special meeting of the VOKS Music Section held on 20 June. This British medal is traditionally awarded to musicians of world fame. This is the forty-ninth award of the medal since the founding of the Royal Philharmonic Society in 1813. Among the most famous recipients are Brahms, Richard Strauss, Edward Elgar, Adelina Patti, Pablo Casals and Fritz Kreisler.

The list of guests at the official presentation of the medal included Sir Archibald Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow; members of the British Military Mission in Moscow headed by Lieutenant General Gammel; members of the British Embassy; Mr. Edwin Smith, Director of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship; the delegation of English scientists headed by Mr. Robinson, attending the anniversary session of the U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences; pro-

minent Soviet musicians; Soviet and foreign newspaper correspondents.

Speeches were made by Sir Archibald Kerr, A. Solodovnikov, Assistant Chairman of the Government Arts Committee and V. Kemenov, President of VOKS.

In his speech of acknowledgement Serge Prokofieff stressed the fact that the award of the medal should be regarded as an expression of the sympathy and friendly feelings which our two victorious peoples harbour for each other.

The official presentation was followed by a concert of Prokofieff's works. The programme included his Second Sonata for Violin and Piano, performed by David Oistrakh and Lev Oborin; Prince Andrei's aria from the opera *War and Peace*, sung by A. Ivanov of the Bolshoi Theatre; *Toccata*, played by the pianist Emil Gilels.



Left to right: Alexander Solodovnikov, Sir Archibald Kerr, Serge Prokofieff, Vladimir Kemenov, Reinhold Gliere

ACADEMICIAN V. VESNIN AWARDED GOLD MEDAL OF ROYAL INSTITUTE OF BRITISH ARCHITECTS

A SPECIAL meeting of the VOKS Architecture Section was held on 13 June to honour Academician V. Vesnin, in connection with his receiving the Gold Medal of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA).

This medal, which was instituted about a century ago, is awarded annually by the King of England for outstanding services in the field of architecture. The list of recipients of this award includes the names of many eminent architects. V. Vesnin is the first Russian architect to receive the medal. The Dnieper Hydro Power Station, one of his greatest projects, is known to the whole world.

Among those present at the meeting in VOKS were Mr. Roberts, the British Minister; members of the British Embassy; Dr. Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, and Mr. A. D'Eye, who accompanied Dr. Johnson during his visit to Russia. Prominent Moscow architects present included A. Shchusev, K. Alabyan, N. Colley, B. Yofan, L. Rudnev, A. Bourov and V. Oltarjevsky.

The meeting was opened by V. Kemenov, President of VOKS and speeches were made by Mr. Roberts, the British Minister; K. Alabyan, Member of the Academy of Architecture; and A. Mordvinov, Chairman of the Government Architecture Committee.

Academician Vesnin expressed his deep gratitude for the honour shown him and said that he viewed the award of this medal not only as a high appreciation of his modest work but also as a symbol of the future strengthening of creative cooperation between the architects of Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

"The victorious people," said Academician Vesnin, "are expecting architects and building engineers to solve tremendously difficult problems today. We have to rehabilitate thousands of cities and villages destroyed by the enemy modernizing them, and to make in the process. Herein lies the historical mission of contemporary architects."



Left to right: Karo Alabyan, Frank Roberts, Victor Vesnin, Vladimir Kemenov, Dr. Hewlett Johnson

VOKS RECEPTION FOR FOREIGN SCIENTISTS

ON 30 JUNE, V. Kemenov, President of VOKS, held a reception in honour of the foreign scientists attending the anniversary session of the U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences. Those present included, besides the foreign guests of the Academy of Sciences, G. Miterev, People's Commissar of Health; M. Litvinov, Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; members of the Presidium of the U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences; academicians; VOKS Vice-President A. Karaganov and Member of the Board of VOKS Lydia Kislova; Soviet and foreign correspondents.

In the course of his speech at this reception V. Kemenov said, "The friendship existing between the scientists of the Soviet Union and those of democratic countries is based on long-standing traditions and has been firmly cemented during our joint

struggle against fascism. Hitlerism has been smashed, but the struggle against the remnants of reaction is still continuing and no scientist who holds progress dear can remain aloof from this struggle. The anniversary session of the Academy of Sciences, in which you have taken part, has borne important results. This, however, is only the first step in the development of constant, close scientific contact between our countries. VOKS and its various sections will be glad to help promote such contact among men of science."


Among the artists participating in the concert given for the guests were the pianist Emil Gilels; the violinist Galina Barinova; Lydia Ruslanova, singer of Russian folk songs; G. Vinogradov, soloist of the Red Army Song and Dance Ensemble; and Serge Obraztsov, Art Director of the Central Puppet Theatre.

CONCERT OF AMERICAN MUSIC

THE U. S. S. R. Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Moscow State Philharmonic Society sponsored a concert of American music at the Chaikovsky Concert Hall in Moscow on 3 July.

Among those attending the concert were Mr. W. Averell Harriman, the United States Ambassador;

Mr. E. Pauley, United States representative on the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission; Mr. Edwin Smith, Director of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship; Dr. Victor Hoo Chi-tsai, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Pu Too-ming, head of the East Asiatic Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Chiang



In Chaikovsky Hall

Ching-Kuo, member of the Chinese delegation visiting Moscow; the Very Reverend Mr. Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, and Mr. A. T. D'Eye, who accompanied him; members of the diplomatic corps and military missions; V. S. Kemenov, Chairman of VOKS, one of the organisations which sponsored the concert; officials of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs; and of VOKS; composers, musicians, theater and movie people, writers, Soviet and foreign newspapermen.

The programme, which was opened by the national anthems of the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A., included George Gershwin's *Rhapsody in Blue*, the piano part of which was superbly rendered by Alexander Tsfasman, and parts of Gershwin's opera *Porgy and Bess*, both works already known in the U. S. S. R.

Among the excerpts from this deservedly famous opera were the picturesque *Festive Song* for chorus (directed by Serafim Popov), Porgy's song, well rendered by I. Petrov, and the duet of Porgy and Bess, with K. Malkova giving a superb rendition of Bess's part.

All other compositions in the programme were heard in Moscow for the first time at this concert.

The first part included Roy Harris's *Ode to Friendship* and Wallingford Riegger's *March in Memoriam*, dedicated to those who have fallen in the struggle against fascism.

Roy Harris's work is known in the U. S. S. R. as a result of the performance of his symphonies (particularly the Fifth, dedicated to the peoples of the

Soviet Union); his overture *Johnny Comes Marching Home* and his first piano sonata.

The second part of the programme was devoted to works by Elie Siegmeister and Samuel Barber, the latter the composer of the Overture to the *School for Scandal* and a sonata for cello which are well known in the Soviet Union.

Barber's *Essay for Orchestra* is a small composition—its performance takes only seven minutes—but it is very expressive and original, one of the composer's first experiments in writing for orchestra. The orchestration of the score is very well done, with a broad and bold application of the strings.

A very strong impression was made by Elie Siegmeister's *Ozark Set*, a composition marked by profound maturity and a deep appreciation of folk music.

All the compositions included in the programme speak of the growing maturity of American music. There is an unmistakable aspiration toward the use of folk music apparent in the works of leading American composers and this is the most hopeful token of the vitality of any art.

The success of this concert, one more proof of the friendship and good will between the Soviet and American peoples, was made possible by the splendid performance given by the orchestra and executants.

Credit for this must be given to the U. S. S. R. Symphony Orchestra and its conductor Nikolai Anosov, whose every appearance confirms his flawless taste, delicate feeling for style and confident professional technique.

BOOKS RECEIVED BY VOKS FROM ABROAD

VOKS wishes to express its gratitude to all individuals and organisations from whom the following books have been received:

N. J. Mott and R. W. Gurney—Electronic Processes in Ionic Crystals.

Ing. E. Rosenthal—Porcelain and Other Ceramic Insulating Materials.

A. R. Matthis—Insulating Varnishes in Electrotechnics.

J. F. Doust and W. J. Sulstock—Properties and Testing of Dielectric Materialism.

Agricultural Statistics, 1944.

H. G. Warren—Plumbing.

W. Fourneaux—Life in Ponds and Streams.

A. Eddington—The Nature of the Physical World.

G. N. Ridley—Man Studies Life.

E. G. R. Taylor—Ideas on the Shape, Size and Movements of the Earth.

S. Gloog—The Missing Technician.

W. L. Randell—S. Z. de Ferranti.

A. Bujant—The Years of Endurance.

M. W. Thomas—The English Heritage.

A. Barber—A Century of Deposit Banking.

J. H. Thompson—The Factorial Analysis of Human Ability.

J. L. Hammond, B. Hammond—The Town Labourer.

J. E. Neale—Queen Elizabeth.

B. Lewis—British Contributions to Arabic Studies.

J. A. Williamson—The Evolution of England.

R. W. Chambers—Thomas More.

Latest List of Livingstone Publications.

F. Kobrak—Contributions to Functional Pathology of the Ear.

P. Manson-Bahr—Synopsis of Tropical Medicine.

W. P. Morrell—Britain and New Zealand.

J. and Ch. Hawkes—Prehistoric Britain—I ex.

S. Smith—Babylonian Historical Texts.

H. Clegg—Medicine in Britain.

Z. Rogers and J. W. D. Megaw—Tropical Medicine.

J. H. Parsons—Diseases of the Eye.

H. G. Armstrong—Principles and Practice of Aviation Medicine.

S. Duckworth—Substitute Feeding Stuffs.

Macintosh and Bannister—Essentials of General Anaesthesia.

H. Clay—The Sanitary Inspector's Handbook.
F. Bamford—Poisons, Their Isolation and Identification.
H. Bailey—Surgery of Modern Warfare.
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C. E. Illingworth—Textbook of Surgical Treatment.
W. Kelsey, Fry and others—The Dental Treatment of Maxillofacial Injuries.
R. Waston-Jones—Fractures and Joint Injuries.
J. Trueta—The Principles and Practice of War-Surgery.
L. Whitby—Disorders of the Blood.
I. Brailsford—The Radiology of Bones and Joints.
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C. Barkeley—A Textbook of Gynaecological Surgery.
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C. H. S. Tupholme—Modern Engineering.

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Kant's Introduction to Logic.
G. H. Thomson—The Factorial Analysis of Human Ability.
R. H. Major—War and Disease.
P. Graves—Rational Medicine.
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A. T. Cameron—A Textbook of Biochemistry.
J. Maxwell—The Care of Tuberculosis in the Home.
Kelsey, Fry and others—Supplement to the Dental Treatment of Maxillo-Facial Injuries.

VOKS has also received numerous gifts for Stalingrad and Leningrad from the American-Russian Institute in San-Francisco. These include the complete works of Robert Burns, Joseph Conrad, George Eliot,

Eugene Field, Bret Harte, Rudyard Kipling, Abraham Lincoln, Edgar Allan Poe, Bernard Shaw, Tobias Smollet, William Thackeray and others.